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ABSTRACT
This study examined the changing representation of characters in young children's
spontaneous stories, and its significance for both narrative and cognitive development.
, .
Narrative research on this topic has been limited in two respects: (a) the focus has been
almost exclusively on delineating the structural criteria ofnarrative complexity based on
sequences of actions and events, with little attention to the selection and representation of
characters; and, (b) the bulk of this research is based on experimentally-elicited stories
that restrict children's use and depiction ofcharacters. Due to these limitations, narrative
research has posited that children do not represent characters' psychological states or
motivations until 7 or 8 years at the earliest, or more reliably around 9 or 10. In contrast,
research on children's early social understanding and "theories ofmind" shows that
children are capable oftalking about their own and others mental states beginning around
2 to 3 years, and develop an understanding ofhow thoughts affect actions by around 4 to
"""
5 years.
The present study addressed this discrepancy by analyzing the complete body of
570 spontaneous stories composed by 30 children, ages 3-5, in a storytelling activity that
formed a regular component of the curriculum in the preschool studied. The guiding
hypothesis was that one important element in the increasing complexity of children's
spontaneous stories is the development of their conceptions and portrayals ofcharacters,
which is facilitated by this activity. Because current developmental research does not
provide an adequate model ofyoung children's conceptions ofpersonhood, this study
proposed two theoretically-motivated models of character representation which were
1
supported by the results. First, a basic typology modeled children's broad movement
from representing simple "actors" at 3 years, to including more basically psychological
and intentional "characters" at 4 and 5 years, to psychologically motivated "persons" by 5
years. A more elaborated, seven-level typology differentiated children's development
within the basic levels. In addition, the basic level of"character" was further
differentia!ed to map out boys' and girls' diff~rent developmental trajectories along the
landscapes of Intention-in-Action and Consciousness.
1
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FROM ACTORS TO CHARACTERS TO PERSONS:
THE DEVELOPMENT OF CHARACTER REPRESENTATION
IN YOUNG CHILDREN'S NARRATIVES.
I. Introduction and Overview
This study examines the changing representation ofcharacters in young
children's spontaneous stories and its significance for both narrative and cognitive
development, which are linked by children's developing un~erstanding ofpersonhood.
Specifically, it aims to investigate the relationship between.children's developing
understanding of the social world and their representation ofthis understanding in
narratives, particularly in their portrayals of characters.
In storytelling, events may be expressed by simply relating the characters'
actions in a temporal sequence. But stories take on more meaning and become more
powerful when told through colorful depictions of characters' internal worlds. As adults
we know that we become involved in stories when we identify with well-represented,
lifelike characters. In becoming good storytellers, children must learn to develop their
story characters through their portrayals of characters' experience, appearances, and
characteristics, and to coordinate characters' actions with their internal mental states--
emotions, desires, and thoughts--and their perceptions of the internal mental states of
other characters. .;'
,
In short, good storytelling integrates a sequence of actions with representations
of characters' internal worlds in order to recreate a social world (Carrithers, 1991). The
two crucial elements of actions and consciousness are what Bruner refers to as the "two
3
landscapes" ofnarrative (1986, p. 14). According to Bruner, stories are only meaningful
when these two landscapes are sufficiently integrated. Nelson also argues that an
important developmental question is "whether and when children incorpora,te the
landscape of consciousness into the landscape of action" (1996, p. 186).
Unfortunately, research in narrative development has not focused in a
systematic and effective way on the development ofchildren's attempts to integrate
landscapes of action with landscapes of consciousness through their portrayal of
characters; at most, it has addressed this subject in a limited and incidental way. For
several decades, the primary focus ofresearch in narrative development has been on
delineating the structural criteria of a "well-formed" narrative based on temporally
connected and causally motivated sequences of events. The widely influential model of a
"well-formed" story developed by Stein and associates (e.g., Stein & Glenn, 1979)
includes such elements as an initiating event, a goal-directed effort by the major
protagonist, an outcome, and possibly an evaluative response and/or reaction. Since this
approach emphasizes children's ability to represent goal-directed activity, it does include
a concern with character portrayal and its development. In fact, an elementary or
prototypical "well-formed" story is conceived, in effect, as an episode that centers on the
portrayal of a goal-directed activity by a single major protagonist (~or a critical overview,
see Nicolopoulou, 1998). However, this interest in character portrayal is largely limited
to asking whether children represent goal-directed activity within this specific structural
framework. Current research rarely explores the wider range ofways in which children's
stories might portray the internal mental lives ofcharacters, and the very few studies
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which take into account some of the ways in which children might portray story
characters do so only in an unsystematic way.
Strikingly, this research has consistently found that children begin to include
portrayals of characters~ernal'states no earlier than 7 or 8 years of age and consolidate
their ability to do this at 9 to 10 years of age. Character representations by younger
children are reported to be very simple and likited to external descriptions of characters'
actions. These reports for younger children are essentially negative because they only
describe what children cannot yet achieve as compared to an adult-based model of story
well-formedness. This study argues that adult-models are inadequate and inappropriate
standards for analyzing young children's stories, because they cannot capture the
development of character representations in young children's narratives with the result
that they conclude that children only begin to represent the internal worlds oftheir
characters around 7 or 8 at the earliest.
These results seem puzzling, however, in light of apparently conflicting
evidence generated by an increasing accumulation ofresearch on preschool children's
social understanding and their "theories ofmind." Evidence from children's performance
on various experimental tasks as well as from their everyday language during interactions
with parents, siblings, and peers suggests that children recognize and talk about their own
and others' emotions and desires by 2-3 years, have a representational understanding of
desire at 3 years, and understand that people have different desires and beliefs around 4.
years of age. Why is it that this psychological understanding ofother people is found to
be so completely absent from their portrayal of characters in young children's narratives?
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This striking discrepancy between these two sets of findings poses a problem that this
study will seek to resolve.
Why has most research in narrative development not been able to find any
evidence ofpreschool children's ability to incorporate their social understanding into their
character portrayals? The argument advanced here is that this outcome stems from a
combination of conceptual and methodological limitations in the main bodies ofexisting
research. Conceptually, investigations of character representation have been guided by a
single criterion of goal-directed activity that might possibly make sense only tor the
evaluation of stories by old~r children and adults. Howev\ this model is too simple, too
adult-oriented, and limited in focus to take into account the actual strategies ofcharacter
representation that younger children might use. To make sense of young children's
pattern of development we need a more refined, differentiated, and elaborated typology of
different models of character representation than existing research in narrative
..
development provides.
Methodologically, the great bulk ofnarrative research has been based on
narratives elicited by experimental procedures (e.g., story stems, story-themes, picture
books) that constrain children's narrative options, and that have the effect ofchanneling
the results toward narratives that fit the postulated model ofnarrative representations,
while shutting Gut alternatives. As Nicolopoulou has shown (e.g., Nicolopoulou, 1996a,
1996b, 1997c), exclusive reliance on data generated by these techniques yields a
systematically misleading picture ofyoung children's narrative abilities, and one would
expect this to be especially true with regard to character representation. Thus, these
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procedures, though intended to facilitate and simplify the child's task, greatly delimit
children's options to select their own characters and to develop clJaracter representations
that reveal their developing understanding ofpersons. To be able to see the kinds of
conceptions ofpersonhood children have, we must allow them to tell their own stories in .
contexts that are meaningful for them and that bring out the children's actual uses of
narratives, whether social or individual. Only spontaneous stories generated by children
in socially situated contexts can be a rich enough source to examine the-actual strategies
children use to represent characters in their stories. The present study is based on such
spontaneous narratives generated by preschool children who told and acted these stories
~
as part of their everyday classroom activities. Since the focus of the research was to
delineate the types ofcharacter representations used by 3-, 4-, and 5-year-old children,
stories told by children from several classrooms were combined in order to obtain stories
from 10 children at each age group, 5 girls and 5 boys.
Since existing narrative research does not provide an adequate model ofhow
children represent their conceptions ofpersonhood through character portrayal, several
areas of research were reviewed in search ofnew and more comprehensive ways to
.capture children's changing representations ofcharacters. Though at first blush Theory-
of-Mind and social understanding research seem likely candidates for a model of
character representation in young children's narratives, they too provetQ_~e inadequate.
Theory-of-Mind research-has focused primarily on preschool children's acquisition of a
"representational theory ofmind" around 4 years of age, and has not focused on other
social aspects ofpreschoolers' person concepts. Furthermore, it does not illuminate
7
children's development ofperson concepts prior to age 4. Although social understanding
research based on children's talk in everyday interactions has a broader focus, including
the understanding ofvery young children, it fails to give a clear developmental sequence
for young children's changing conceptions ofpersons.
A third candidate is research on children's self- and other-descriptions that
focuses broadly on children's explicit conceptions ofpersonhood. However, the.
emphasis of this research is on developmental changes between major stages of
childhood, and it is primarily based on cognitive models which are also inadequate to
model character rep~esentation in young children's narratives. Overall, missing from
research on self- and other-conceptions is a consideration of the socially-embedded nature
of children's understanding of themselves and others, which is necessary to capture their
developing representation ofcharacters as portrayed in their narratives.
The following sections will review these areas of research before turning to
consider some theoretical models ofperson concept development. A theoretically-
motivated model of character representation will be proposed to analyze character
representations in stories by 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds. The analysis will attempt to integrate
this model with data from Theory-of-Mind and social understanding research, as well as
preliminary observations ofpreschool children's strategies for complexifying story
characters, to trace the development of character representation in young children's
.narratives.
8
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II. Narrative Research
A. Problem: A Structural Conceptualization of Character Representation is
the Only Game in Town
The following review of research on children's narratives reveals that it has not
systematically or effectively studied either children's representation of characters, or the
relation between children's developing conceptions ofpersons and their representation of
story characters. This is true not only for children's narratives, but for adults' narratives
as well. Toolan (1988) argues that this neglect is due to (a) narratologists' reluctance to
accept the notions of"character, individuals, and the self' (p. 90) as relevant constructs
for examination, as well as (b) the difficulty of analyzing character portrayal
systematically. Though Toolan was writing primarily about narratological accounts of
adult fiction, the same is true ofnarrative developmental research focused on children's
abilities to tell stories.
In general, narrative research has focused primarily on the delineation ofthe
structural criteria ofnarrative complexity based on temporally connected and causally
motivated sequences of actions and events. Specifically, children's narratives are
evaluated on the basis ofwhether or not they meet the criteria of ''well-formedness''
defined by adult models of story structure (Stein & Glenn, 1979). These models specify
the necessary action sequences that define a well-formed episode, such as an initiating
event, formulation of a goal, attempts to achieve the goal, outcomes, and an overall
reaction or evaluation. Even other attempts to break away from strict structural models of
narrative (such as functional analyses, which will be reviewed later) share the same basic
9
conclusions regarding children's abilities to develop their character representations,
because they analyze stories elicited by structurally-based techniques (which also will be
discussed later). One result ofthese analyses is that young children's stories are
evaluated in one-sidedly negative tenns of the criteria that they do not yet achieve
(Nicolopoulou, 1997a, 1998). This research has concluded that preschoolers tend not to
. ,
produce well-fonned stories at all, and therefore, their stories are not worth considering
any further. Thus, because narrative research has disregarded young children's efforts to
tell stories, it has not sought to uncover the strategies that children may use to create and
complexify their stories. Instead, a large amount ofresearch effort has been spent on
delineating when and how children's stories come to match adult models, resulting in
several unfortunate consequences (Nicolopoulou, 1996b, 1997a).
The present study attempts to address one particularly unfortunate result ofthe use
of adult models to evaluate young children's stories: a lack of systematic attention to
children's strategies for character representation. A core argument ofthis study is that
preschool children can and do develop complex and psychological representations of
characters in their stories, and that the development ofcharacter representation is a
central aspect in their narrativydevelopment. Furthennore, this study proposes that
children's character representations are an important expression oftheir developin~ social
unders~ing a valuable window into their conceptions of self and other. In
this respect, understanding the development ofchildren's character representations is a
task of essential importance for narrative research.
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To date, however, narrative research has given little systematic attention to
children's strategies for character representation; instead, it has considered character
representation only in light ofthe structural criteria derived from well-formed, adult-
based narrative mod~ls: that is, in terms of the portrayal of characters' implicit or explicit
. intentions, goal plans, and reactions to outcomes. Hence, studies have focused on
children's abilities to construct well-formed story episodes using structural criteria, and
have provided only anecdotal evidence for some limited, structurally-defined, aspects of
character portrayal. When children's stories are evaluated in this way, studies conclude
that children are unable to represent motivated or psychological characters until they have
mastered the elements of structural complexity needed to tell a well-formed story--that is,
some time during middle childhood. Children's stories that lack basic structural criteria
are usually disregarded from analyses altogether, and therefore children's own strategies
for character representation are practically ignored. Moreover, preschool children's
character portrayals have been described as impoverished, action-based, and lacking
psychological reality (Leondar, 1977; Shapiro & Hudson, 1991; Stein, 1988; Stein &
Glenn, 1979). Although functional research has attempted to broaden its analysis of
children's narratives in general, it borrows research methods based on structural models,
resulting in similar evaluations ofyoung children's character representations.
The limited evidence gleaned from research on young children's narratives,
together with evidence from research focusing more specifically on character
representation by older children and adults (Feldman, Bruner, & Kalmar, 1993; Fox,
1987, 1990, 1991) suggests that a shift in character portrayal from external characteristics
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and events to psychological descriptions and motivations occurs late in childhood--
around 7 or 8 at the earliest, but more reliably around 9 to 10 years of age. Around this
time, children begin to introduce descriptions of characters' internal and psychological
states, which are said to be absent in younger children's stories. This evidence will be
presented and assessed below.
B. Research Evidence
B.1. Story Production Tasks: Character Representation in Structural
Analysis. Although most narrative researchers are interested in children's ability to
comprehend or produce structurally complex stories, over the years some have come to
acknowledge the necessity of considering the relationship between children's developing
social understanding and their development of storytelling skill. For instance, Stein
states, "[s]ince stories reflect the structure and content ofpersonal and interpersonal
knowledge, it becomes increasingly important to understand the relationship between the
development of social knowledge and the development ofgood storytelling skills" (1988,
p.282). However, her research practice betrays her long-held structuralist emphasis (see
in particular Stein & Glenn, 1979; Stein & Policastro, 1984; Stein & Trabasso, 1982) and
does not really illuminate a "relationship" between children's social understanding and
story structure. Instead, her focus on how children's developing ability to produce an
adult-like story structure dictates what social knowledge they can incorporate into story
content.
Stein's (1988) priority to story structure is reflected by the coding categories she
used in a series of studies conducted with her collaborators that analyzed kindergarten,
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third-, and fifth-grade children's completions ofthree story stems. In these studies,
children were asked to tell a story about (a) "a fox who lived in the forest," (b) "a girl
named Alice, who lived by the seashore," and (c) "a boy named Alan who had lots of
toys." Children's stories generated by these story topics were evaluated for the types of
structural elements they included. Stein did not attempt to draw any relationship between
her structural criteria and children's representation of social understanding in their stories,
except to note that very few ofthe children (through fifth grade) included motivational or
psychological portrayals of their characters.. Even the older children who included
internal portrayals of their characters did not use these traits to explain the characters'
actions. She concluded that at fifth grade, children still needed to develop the ability to
represent the relationships between beliefs and actions in their stories.
In a recent chapter, these same stem-elicited stories were reanalyzed to address the
development ofcoherence and complexity in children's narratives (Stein & Albro, 1997).
This reanalysis defined one strategy for building narrative complexity and coherence,
namely character intentionality, as either implicit or explicit reference to characters'
motivations for action. However, like other structuralist research, this study argued that
children cannot express their understanding ofcharacter intentionality until they have
mastered the most essential elements of a well-formed story, or a simple episode that
includes an initiating event or goal, an attempt, and an outcome. This analysis focused on
how children use each ofthese structural elements to build narratives. Though most
kindergartners produced about one story (out of three) that included all these criteria,
children did not consistently tell stories with the necessary structural elements until fifth
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grade. The comparison of children's abilities to explicitly represent characters' goals (the
only category related to character representation) showed that even by fifth grade,
children included characters' goals in only halfof their episodic stories. This study did
not consider character representation in stories that did not meet the structural criteria of
an episode.
Similarly, Trabasso and his associates (Trabasso & Nickels, 1992; Trabasso &
Rodkin, 1994) have focused on goal plans as a unit of story structure. Although they
were not interested in children's character representations per se, they did comment in
passing that goal plans were constructed by the application of "naive theories of
psychological and physical causation" (Trabasso & Nickels, p. 249). However, Trabasso
and Nickels' study did not focus on the various ways in which children might apply these
theories to their story character representations, but focused more narrowly on children's
incorporation of their knowledge about plans and intentionality into stories.
In this study, Trabasso and Nickels (1992) reanalyzed a corpus ofchildren's
stories told by English-speaking children, originally collected as part ofa larger cross-
linguistic study coordinated by Berman and Slobin (1994). In this study, children were
asked to tell a story based on an episodically-structured, commercially available picture
book, Frog. where are you? (Mayer, 1969). The picture book portrays the story ofa little
boy who loses his frog and then tries to find it, through several embedded goal-attempt-
10----
failure subepisodes, before he succeeds. Though the study focused solely on children's
ability to represent the main character's goal plans, Trabasso and Nickels' analysis
showed that young children could not produce this type of character representation.
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Rather, from 3 to 5 years of age, children's narrations changed from primarily naming
and describing objects depicted in the story book to providing disconnected actions that
were interpreted as being related to the goal presented in the picture sequence. Children
did not reliably produce goal descriptions in this study until 9 years of age. Like most
studies focusing only on types of character representations required for structural
complexity defined for a well-formed episodic sto,ry, Trabasso and Nickels (1992)
concluded that preschool children were not capable ofrepresenting complex characters
and did not analyze the stories further to determine ifchildren used any other strategies
for character representation and complexification.
B. 2. Story Production Tasks: Character Representation in Functional
Analysis. In contrast to the strictly structural definitions ofcharacter motivation and
representation used in the studies summarized above, some researchers have taken a more
functional perspective when analyzing children's story structure and character
representation. Functional analyses mainly focus on the linguistic forms that children use
to achieve story functions and complexity. Unfortunately, even these studies do not pay
systematic attention to children's specific strategies for character portrayal. In effect,
they simply use less strenuous criteria for what counts as character portrayal, and end up
with broad categories that lump together various types of character representation.
Therefore, like more structural accounts ofchildren's narrative development, research
focusing on functional aspects ofnarrative development cannot provide an accurate
picture of the development of character representation in children's narratives.
Furthermore, functional research on narrative development often analyzes stories elicited
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by structurally-focused techniques (such as the Frog, where are you? [Mayer, 1969] story
book) to .elicit children's stories. Because these elicitation techniques limit children's
abilities to create their own stories, functional analyses have not found development in
young children's character portrayals, even by less stringent criteria. Instead, both
approaches simply conclude that young children do not represent psychologically
complex story characters.
For instance, Berman and Slobin (1994) provide "developmental profiles" (pp.
57-84) that describe the patterns ofnarrative development as revealed through analyzing
narrations elicited by using the previously-mentioned children's picture-story book, Frog,
where are you? Narrations were collected from children, ages 3, 5, and 9, and from
adults, from five different language groups (English, German, Hebrew, Spanish, and
Turkish). The narratives produced by each age group were evaluated to determine how
well speakers could connect the major theme ofthe story (the boy looking for his lost
frog) to each embedded subepisode presented in the pictures. Berman and Slobin
characterized 3-year-olds as having difficulty constructing coherent narratives; instead,
they produced narratives that were based on the saliency of each picture in the book,
without the ability to organize them through the use of a hierarchical concept ofmulti-
episode story structure. Although the 5-year-olds were somewhat better at temporally
ordering and connecting events in their stories within the subepisodes, only the 9-year-
olds began to causally connect the episodes and subepisodes of the boy's adventures to
his central goal of finding his frog. Overall, hierarchical story structure (i.e., episodes
with embedded subepisodes) was consistently used only by the adults.
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Berman and Slobin noted that 9-year-olds included descriptions ofcharacters'
mental states and emotions at the same time they began to tell structurally coherent
narratives. Although some 5-year-olds were capable ofmentioning a few emotions in
their stories, these were usually directly connected to the character's emotional
expressions depicted in the picture book. Berman and Slobin concluded that young
children are capable of telling very simple stories, and only older children and adults go
beyond listing characters' actions in order to provide the motivation of characters'
actions, and thus to provide more hierarchically-organized narratives with episodes and
.subepisodes. Only at this point did children include other psychological states in their
character representations.
Bamberg and Damrad-Frye (1991) used a Labovian analysis of story-narrations
by 5-year-olds, 9-year-olds, and adults, also in response to the Frog. where are you?
book-elicitation technique. In contrast to more structural analyses (e.g., Stein, 1988)
which only analyze story events corresponding to a preformed model of a well-formed
story, Bamberg and Damrad-Frye's Labovian analysis divided all the clauses in the
narrations into either narrative clauses (action-based, past tense clauses that move the
\
narrative) and evaluative clauses (which include truly evaluative clauses that tell the
reader why the story or an event ina story is interesting or significant, but may also
include character representations). Labovian analyses evaluate narrators' abilities to use
both types of clauses to relate and evaluate basic story structure: An Orientation, followed
by Complicating Action, Resolution, and (optional) Coda (Labov, 1972; Labov &
Waletzky, 1967). Bamberg and Damrad-Frye (1991) focused on children's use of
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evaluative clause types to build complexity in their narratives. In their analysis,
evaluative clauses were subdivided into several categories. One such category grouped
together clauses describing characters' thoughts, desires, and emotions, which they called
"frames ofmind." Another category of evaluative clauses, portrayals of characters'
speech, was the only other category related to character representation.
Like Berman and Slobin (1994), Bamberg and Damrad-Frye (1991) found that
although the 5-year-olds included evaluative clauses in their narratives, they included
them much less than both 9-year-olds and adults. In addition, the 5-year-olds showed no
particular preference for any evaluative types, and did not include many character
descriptions. Nine-year-olds and adults, however, showed a clear preference for
including more representations of characters' thoughts, desires, and emotions than any
other evaluative type. Bamberg and Damrad-Frye also noted that when the 5-year-olds
did include "frames ofmind" for the story characters, they simply used an emotional state
verb to describe a character's physical expression of emotion as pictured in the story book
(e.g., The little boy frowns at his dog, after it falls out of a window and breaks a jar).
They suggested that even the 9-year-old children did not spontaneously use character's
mental states in their narratives, but were bound by the events as depicted in the pictures
.of the story-book. In particular, most of the younger children's references to a character's
"frame ofmind" were produced during their narrations of the frowning boy in the picture
described above, and the children simply said the boy was "mad" or "angry," without
connecting the emotion to any actions.
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Taken' together, the results from studies utilizing the Frog. where are you? book-
elicitation technique seem to suggest that the structure ofchildren's narrations as well as
the frequency and type ofcharacter representations is strongly dependent on the
information provided in the pictures of the book. In short, young children rarely
elaborate their narratives beyond what is presented to them in the pictures.
This suggestion is further supported by a series of studies aimed at testing
children's understanding of story concept{Yussen, 1982). In one study, second graders,
seventh graders and adults were asked to produce stories based on 12 picture sequences
from the Picture Arrangement subtest of the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children
(WISC). Yussen described a "remarkable absence" of any representation ofcharacter
motivations, goals, and feelings in the children's stories (p. 261). He also reported that,
although adults represented descriptions ofcharacters' internal states, even seventh
graders failed to give any type of complex 'character representations. It should be noted
that the picture sequences used in this experiment did not show any physical expressions
of characters' emotions, suggesting that even children much older than those in Berman
and Damrad-Frye's (1994) study were restricted by the materials used for elicitation.
(The implications ofusing experimental elicitation techniques for studying children's
character portrayal will be discussed in more detail later.)
However, even studies using less structured elicitation procedures have found a
similar lack of complex character portrayals in young children's narratives. For instance,
Hudson and Shapiro (1991) have found that even third graders (the oldest children in
their study) did not include complex character portrayals in their stories. In this study,
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preschool, first-, and third-grade children were given four story topics (birthday, doctor's
visit, Halloween, and trip) and were asked to either give a scripted summary ("Can you
tell me what happens when..."), a personal narrative ("Can you tell me what happened
one time when you..."), or a make-believe story ("Can you tell me a make-believe story
about. ..") for each story topic (p. 107). Although the authors focused primarily on
children's developing ability to produce structural elements required for each of these
different story types, they also analyzed children's representation of"any infomiation
about emotional or physical states and reference to internal thought processes" of the
characters (p. 109). Hudson and Shapiro found that even by third grade, children did not
include complex character portrayals in their stories and they attributed this finding to the
fact that children do not produce goal-based stories until later. Thus, although Hudson
and Shapiro used less stringent criteria for what constituted character portrayal than
previously reviewed structural research, they nonetheless concluded that character
portrayal is a product of a goal-directed episodic structure, and therefore not present in
young children's stories.
McCabe's (McCabe & Peterson, 1983; McCabe, 1997) three-way analysis of
children's narratives ofpersonal experiences, told during an interview with an
experimenter, did not explicitly focus on any specific elements ofcharacter portrayal.
Rather, personal narratives by children of every age between 3 ~ to 9 years were
evaluated for their syntactic complexity, for construction of goal-directed episodes, and
for the Labovian elements deemed necessary for a well-formed narrative. The Labovian
analysis determined whether children were able to create, evaluate, and close a climactic
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event or "high-point" in their personal narratives. In their summary of children's
developing abilities to produce stories with increasing structural complexity, Peterson and
McCabe (1983) suggested that children may not represent the psychological
characteristics or motivations ofcharacters until they can construct a "goal-directed,
problem solving episode" (p. 99). Instead, they argued that young children can only
report their own reactions to "externally imposed events" (1983, p. 99).
B.3. An Alternative Approach: Analysis of Spontaneous Narratives. Other
researchers have analyzed spontaneous (usually fictional) narratives told by children, and
the results regarding children's character representations are very similar to studies of
elicited narratives. The majority of these studies have analyzed stories from two major
collections: (1) Pitcher and Prelinger's (1963) collection of spontaneous stories told by
children from each age group between 2 and 5 years of age, and (2) Sutton-Smith's
(1981) collection of stories told by children from each age group between 2 and 11 years
of age. Pitcher and Prelinger's (1963) corpus was collected primarily by researchers
(though the youngest children's stories were sometimes collected by the children's
mothers or teachers), who asked the children to tell them a story. Two stories per 3- and
4-year-old, and one story per 5-year-old were elicited. In addition, only children's
original stories were used, not stories children had already heard or seen on television.
Sutton-Smith's corpus was collected by psychology graduate students in a preschool and
elementary school setting in New York City. The corpus includes stories from children
who volunteered to tell stories over a two-year period of time. Their sample included 51
children who told about 10 stories each.
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Pitcher and Prelinger analyzed their stories for the representation of character.
Although they had hoped to find development in children's representation of characters'
thoughts and emotions, they reported only "hints" of a trend toward more sophisticated
character portrayals with age. They suggested that even the 5-year-olds "were little
concerned" (p. 156) with representing the inner complexity of their characters, and the
overall number of complex character representations was "quite small" (p. 159).
Although Sutton-Smith did not focus on character representation, his data were re-
analyzed by Kemper (1984), who analyzed stories from both the Sutton-Smith and
Pitcher and Prelinger corpora by attempting to account for narrative complexity by
identifying the implicit and explicit causal chains in the stories. In this analysis, each
story clause was classified into three categories: (1) actions or events; (2) physical states,
which included physical descriptions of characters, objects, and events; and (3) mental
states, like thoughts, emotions, or desires. Kemper argued that changes between clause
categories (e.g., change from Action [Character received present] to Mental State
[Character felt happy]) require causal connections (i.e., Receiving the present caused the
character to be happy). In this model, a series of transitions between clause categories
makes up a causal chain, or the structure of a narrative. Simple causal chains are implicit,
and are made up by shifts between simple actions and states; whereas more complex
causal chains are made up by explicit causal connections between characters' internal
states, actions, and outcomes. Therefore, the more complex and explicit the causal chain,
the more complex the narrative, and the more psychological the character representations.
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Kemper's analysis of children's stories showed a developmental change in chain
structure, which also revealed a development in children's character representations. She
found that 2- to 5-year-olds primarily listed character's actions without any motivations
or consequences. Around 4 years ofage, children began to link actions with physical
states, and 5-year-olds began to describe characters' motivations for acting. Although
this trend continued gradually, even the lO-year-olds failed to consistently link
characters' actions to descriptions ofmental states. Kemper concluded that although
there is gradual development in children's ability to describe causes and consequences of
the actions in a story, most children cannot adequately link actions, physical states, and
mental states until after 10 years ofage.
Leondar (1977) also looked more specifically at children's character portrayals in
her analysis ofchildren's spontaneous stories. She is one ofthe very few who have
argued that both narrative structure and character representation are important aspects for
children's narrative development. With respect to children's representation of characters
she stated that "characters there must be even if, as Aristotle insisted, they exist only for
the sake of action" (pp. 176-177). However, Leondar's conclusion was that preschool
children only represent characters in terms of their actions (or what she very loosely calls
"plot"), and do not represent more complex descriptions or psychological states. Her
analysis of children's stories concluded that they were "all plot, and not much besides"
(p.180). She suggested that most children tell skeletal, "primary narratives" (p. 180) from
the ages of4 or 5 until the age of 8 or 9. Primary narratives are those which have the
most basic structural criteria of a beginning, middle, and end, but whose "plots are bare
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and unelaborated and...[a]ttributes ofthought, feeling, or motive are entirely absent" (p.
181). Leondar does note that young children do include specific external descriptions of
characters, but only rarely.
Finally, Haslett (1986) analyzed stories that children of each age group from 5 to
7 years wrote and also dictated to an experimenter during a one-week period. The stories
were analyzed using Labov's "high point" analysis of story structure (that is, the stories
were evaluated for their use ofan Orientation, Complicating Action, Resolution, and
Coda). In addition, the number and types of evaluative clauses (clauses that deviate from
the actions or events of the story but give the reader "the point" of the story) were
analyzed. Haslett found that the structural complexity and connectedness of actions in
the stories increased with each age group, but that only the 7-year-old children began to
represent dialogues, thoughts, and feelings ofcharacters. Seven-year-olds also began to
link character's plans and motives to actions. Although character portrayal was not
explicitly linked to structural complexity in this study, as in those previously reviewed,
there was still no explicit analysis of character portrayal per se. Haslett only commented
on patterns ofcharacter portrayal in her discussion of the evaluative clause types used by
children in each age group without providing a fuller picture of the abilities ofthe
children in this respect.
B. 4. Character Representation by Older Children and Adults. Studies
focusing on character representation by older children and adults support the previously
presented findings with younger children, which suggest that children do not begin to
construct complex and psychological character representations until late in middle
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childhood, around 9 or 1°years of age. However, these studies of older children and
adults are notable because they focus explicitly on character representation, and therefore
consider a greater numberofaspects of character portrayal beyond those aspects
subordinated to strictly structural categories of a goal-directed activity used in many
studies ofyounger children's stories. Unfortunately, these studies do not go beyond
describing the types of character representation used by each age group in rather general
terms, and tend to conflate various dimensions of character representation (e.g., character
descriptions with character coordination). (These liinitations will become more apparent
later on when I present.my own model of character representation in young children's
narratives.) In addition, these studies also lack any explanations or possible mechanisms
for the development of different types of character representation.
Fox (1987, 1990, 1991) described a developmental progression of "how
characters become persons" (from the 1990 title) based on stories of elementary school
children ages 7, 9, 11, and 13. In these studies, teachers asked children to write two
stories, entitled "The visitor" and "The day I ran away from home." Each story was rated
by assigning one of five character representation levels to ten different character
"aspects" (or ways of representing characters, such as by describing characters'
situations, physical characteristics and traits, mental states, relations with other
characters, and so on). The character representation levels describe increasingly complex
ways of representing elements ofcharacters' motivations, thoughts, interactions and
roles. Complexity was also evaluated in terms ofhow many characters were elaborated
in the story. Each character aspect was evaluated and assigned a level from this
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complexity measure (1987, 1991). In addition, the overall complexity of character
representation in a story was evaluated by averaging the assigned character representation
levels from each aspect (1987) as well as by applying the five character representation
levels to the story as a whole (1990).
In one study, Fox (1991) analyzed two character aspects, (1) descriptions of
characters' internal or psychological states, including physiological states, emotions,
desires, and thoughts and (2) characters expression oftheir internal states through actions
or communication. He found that most 7- and 9-year-olds only represented their
characters in terms of solitary actions and goals, and did not clearly or consistently
represent the characters' internal worlds (Levell). If these children did attempt to
represent characters in psychological terms, they primarily portrayed characters' physical
expression or communication to implicitly represent the internal states ofjust one
character (Levels 1 and 2). Although some 9-year-olds were able to give more complex
character representations, only the 11-year-01ds consistently portrayed characters as
dialoging about their thoughts, or represented main characters who evaluated their own
internal states (Level 3). Between the ages of 11 and 13, children could fully describe
and coordinate the thoughts, feelings, and plans of their various story characters (Level
4). Fox's fifth level, in which characters' thoughts about social issues are represented
was rare even among 13-year-olds.
Fox's levels were more specifically aimed at capturing children's changing
abilities to represent characters' psychological complexity than studies more interested in
the structural complexity of children's narratives. However, his descriptions support
26
..
------findings from other studies, which suggest that children only begin to develop
sophisticated character representations late in middle childhood. The character
representation levels in his model begin to fill out the details on how children at this age
go about complexifying their character representations. However, Fox's attempt to
capture increasing complexity in children's character representations conflates various
aspects of character representation, which I consider to be separate, and thus
developmentally independent. Some such dimensions include the type and depth of
representation (settings and situations, descriptions, interactions, actions, perceptions,
intentions, emotions, desires, or thought), how this' is portrayed (through characters'
actions, speech, or descriptions), and how many characters are represented at each level.
From Fox's levels, it is hard to draw a clear picture ofwhat exactly develops in children's
character representations or how each level is connected to the next one. Though these
levels seem to be nothing more than a very broad description of the data, it is at least
clear that children begin to develop their character representations beyond actions and
descriptions, to include psychological states beginning around the age of9. These
finding also support the results of the narrative research outlined earlier.
A second study suggests that the psychological turn in character representation
continues through adolescence into adulthood. Feldman, Bruner, Kalmar, and Renderer
(1993) asked pre-adolescents (ages 10-12), adolescents (ages 15-19), and adults (ages 26-
49) questions during and after the reading of two short fictional stories about the
adventures, crises points, and decisions of the young men who were the main protagonists
in the stories. The questions were asked during the reading of the story to assess each age
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group's strategies for story interpretation. Feldmanet al. analyzed the anSWyrs from each
age group given to questions like "What's the most important thing I've told you so far?"
and "What are the directions this could be going?" (p. 329) to understand how each age
group interprets story events and characters differently. The analysis showed that the 10-
to l2-year-olds' answers focused more on the actions in a "plot," and explained
characters' actions in terms of their intentions and motivations. Adolescents focused on
characters' "plight," or situation in terms ofwhat characters "have to" do, or how they
react to the events around them (p. 333). Adults focused on "dramatism" (p. 334), which
combined action with fuller descriptions of characters' knowledge (or lack thereof) and
considerations ofpossible situations and actions for the characters (e.g., "He's trying to
do the right thing without really knowing why he's trying to do it." [po 334]).
Although Feldman et al. (1993) focused specifically on the development of
strategies for interpreting stories, and used participants a good deal older than the
previously described story production studies, the pattern ofresult nonetheless supports a
similar action-to-thought shift in character representation between childhood and
adulthood. Though not entirely specific to character representation, this study does
suggest that people of different ages use different models of action and ofcharacter to
understand stories. Feldman et at. argue that these results may be extended to story
production as well as to other age groups. They argue that even preschoolers have their
own models for telling stories, although they do not elaborate what types ofmodels
preschoolers may use. So, although the data presented in the Feldman et al. study do not
bear directly on children's character representations in their own story productions, the
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results do suggest multiple models for understanding and representing characters which
develop with age (albeit Feldman et al.'s data were from older children and adults). As
such, Feldman et al. adds a significant argument against structural models, which suggest
that children's narrative development is merely a gradual movement toward an adult story
structure, which is attained by 9-10 years. Instead, they suggest that different age groups
may have qualitatively different, yet complete working models of story and ofcharacter.
However, they do very little in the way of explaining what younger children's models for
story or for character representation might be like, and do not specify how a
developmental trajectory might progress.
C. Summary
The preceding discussion has sought to provide a comprehensive review of
existing narrative research that directly or indirectly addresses children's representation
ofcharacters. Two conclusions can be gleaned from this review: (1) there is a lack of any
systematic or well-integrated research effort toward understanding.how children represent
characters in their stories; and (2) there has been a general consensus that children do not
represent story characters in psychological terms until sometime during middle
childhood, around 7 or 8 at the earliest. I will now turn to discuss each of these points
further.
The general lack of systematic or well-integrated research effort toward
understanding how children represent story characters is primarily the result of the
strongly structuralist tendencies of research in narrative development. For the most part,
research in this area has been primarily interested in delineating children's development
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of structural complexity in their narratives. In this view, narrative development is seen as
children's gradual acquisition and use of a story concept that matches the adult model of
a well-formed story. This story model is generally taken to be a goal-directed single
episode story that has a beginning, with an initiating event or problem; a middle, with a
protagonist's reaction to the initiating event, including the formation of a goal and an
action sequence attempting to carry out the goal; and an end, in which the protagonist
either succeeds or fails to accomplish the goal, and reacts to this consequence. In
structurally-focused research, children's stories are evaluated in terms of their inclusion
ofthese elements ofplot structure. Because young children's story-telling attempts lack
many, ifnot most, of these structural criteria, they are considered not to be stories at all,
and the goal ofnarrative research has been to trace children's gradual inclusion of these
structures in their stories rather than uncovering children's own interests or strategies for
developing narrative complexity. Hence, there has been no motivation for research to
launch a specific and inclusive investigation of the various ways in which children
represent characters.
Furthermore, any interest in character representation has been defined in terms of
these structural criteria of story well-formedness (e.g., emotional reactions to problems
and outcomes, goal setting and intention) with the result that even structurally-focused
narrative research has given a limited picture of some aspects of children's character
representations. In fact, research interested in the development ofstructural complexity
in children's narratives has looked either specifically at the representation ofcharacter's
goal plans, or more broadly at whether or not characters are represented in terms of any
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internal states. As outlined above, these studies have concluded that preschoolers' stories
are primarily sequences of actions and that children only begin to complexify their story
plots by adding characters' intentions, motivations, and emotions by 7 or 8 years of age,
at the earliest. Some have suggested that even at this late age, children may only
represent characters' goals and motivations when they are given the support of an
episodically structured picture sequence to narrate. Likewise, it has been argued that
children's descriptions of characters' emotional reactions are strongly dependent on
support from pictures ofcharacters smiling or frowning (Bamberg & Damrad-Frye, 1994;
Shapiro & Hudson, 1991; Yussen, 1982).
As a result of this apparently overwhelming lack of evidence for any sort of
development ofcharacter representation until late in childhood, even the few researchers
interested in character representation as an important aspect ofnarrative development
(e.g., Leondar, 1977; Pitcher & Prelinger, 1963; Nelson, 1996) accept that young children
cannot represent story characters in complex ways. Hence, no seriou~ effort has been
made to study young children's character representations.· For instance, Nelson (1996)
seems to acknowledge the importance ofcharacter representations for narrative
development, ".. .it is the intentionality of the actors that provides the consciousness, and
ultimately the meaning, to the story..." (p. 188), but notes, "[a]nalyses ofyounger
children's story productions have uncovered little evidence of the semantics or meaning
ofBruner's 'landscape of consciousness.'. .. This suggests that by kindergarten age, -
children... fail to incorporate it into their own productions" (pp. 214-215).
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In summary, both the hegemonic influence of str'l;lctural analysis in most narrative
research, and the apparent lack of any evidence supporting the development of character
representation in early childhood have led to the remarkable disregard ofyoung
children's character representations in narrative research. The limited research
specifically aimed at understanding character representation has looked at stories by older·
children and adults, when the development ofcharacter representation is said to begin.
The present study aims to remedy this lack by focusing on young children's character
representation in a systematic and theoretically-motivated way.
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III. Social Understanding and Theory of Mind Research
In light ofthe evidence reviewed so far, a study focused on the development of
young children's character representations may seem unnecessary, even ludicrous.
However, in contrast to narrative developmental research suggesting that children do not
represent characters' motivations or internal states until well into middle childhood,
evidence from research on children's developing social understanding suggests that
young children construct a rich understanding of their own and others' psychological
states and use this understanding to interpret and predict others' actions. Research on the
development of children's social understanding has begun to map out a trajectory that
follows children's understanding ofpeople's external behavior to their internal states and
motivations. The discrepancy between narrative developmental research and research
delineating the early development ofchildren's concepts of themselves and others raises
an interesting question regarding the reported absence of complex character
representations in young children's narratives. To answer this question, I will first
highlight the content, pattern, and timing of development in children's social
understanding, then provide several possible explanations for the apparent lag between
children's character representations in narrative research and that of their social
understanding".
A. General Pattern of Development
In the past decades, research in social understanding has shown that from infancy,
children begin to construct an understanding of themselves and others, as well as how
people interact with one another. Early on, babies recognize the differences between
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objects and people, and soon learn to construct the connections between people, actions,
and objects. Eventually, their social understanding includes connections between
people's actions, reactions, motives, knowledge, and other internal states. Thus, soon
after their acquisition oflanguage, children begin to talk about people's simple
psychological states in everyday conversation around 2-3 years of age. One particular
development in social understanding, children's acquisition ofa "theory ofmind," allows
children to explain and predict their own and others' actions based on their developing
knowledge of the causal nature ofmental states like desire and belief.
Theory-of-Mind research focuses specifically on children's development of the
understanding that other people have minds and that the mind constructs representations
ofthe world (that is, beliefs about the state of affairs in the world) that affect people's
actions. Researchers argue that children develop a representational model ofthe mind
during early childhood, sometime between the ages of2 and 5. Infants do not have an
understanding of others' minds, but gradually develop the understanding that actions are
caused by agents, and gain practical knowledge about others' gaze direction and
expression of emotions. During toddlerhood, children are said to develop understanding
of others' perceptions, emotions, and desire. Then, during the preschool years, children
acquire a mature "theory ofmind" and begin to understand its representational nature.
(For useful reviews, see Astington, 1993; Flavell & Miller, 1998; Flavell, Miller, &
Miller, 1993; Moses & Chandler, 1992; Taylor, 1996.)
Interestingly, this general trajectory of development resembles the physical to
psychological shifts described in the narrative literature outlined above. However,
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Theory-of-Mind researchers argue that children move from physicalistic to mentalistic
conceptions ofpersons roughly between the ages of 2 and 5. Thus, children's
development of a theory ofmind occurs at a considerably earlier age than the shift
documented in the narrative literature, which is said to begin around 7-8 years at the
earliest, but most reliably occurring around 9-10 years of age. In order to understand why
these apparently similar shifts in understanding might occur at considerably different
ages, it is necessary to delineate what type ofknowledge is involved in the young child's
"theory ofmind" and then examine how this knowledge is similar to, or different from,
the knowledge expressed in children's narrative depictions ofcharacter.
A.1. False Belief Understanding and Belief-Desire Psychology. Although
social cognition research deals broadly with children's progression from physical to
psychological conceptions of themselves and others, much interest has focused
specifically on the child's ability to understand that people may have beliefs or ideas that
are discrepant from reality. For these researchers, the child's ability to understand that
people have false beliefs is proof that the child has a representational understanding ofthe
mind, or to put it differently, the child understands that minds think and that their
thoughts are representations of reality. In other words, false beliefunderstanding
signifies that the child can understand that minds represent the external world in an
internal, subjective fashion. When children have a mature theory ofmind, they can
understand that the mind's representations are actively constructed (rather than copied
from the world), and therefore may not match the world perfectly, but may be
mismatched, or false.
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To test for false beliefunderstanding, Theory-of-Mind researchers use variations
ofa basic experimental paradigm commonly called the "false-belief task." In this
paradigm, experimenters usually tell children a story about two characters, using pictures
or puppets as visual aids. In the most common versions of the story, one character places
a prized object in a particular location and then leaves the room. While the first character
is gone, a second character moves the object to a second location and then also leaves.
Finally, the first chara-cter reenters the room, and the child is asked where the first
character will look for the prized object. If the child responds that the character will look
in the place where the second character moved it, or where the object actually is, one
concludes that the child has not yet achieved false beliefunderstanding, or a does not
have a "theory ofmind." Children who do not have a mature "theory ofmind" are not
able to understand that the representations of the two characters are different. However,
if the child responds correctly that the first character will look in the place where she
originally placed it (and thus where she should think it is) then one concludes that the
child has achieved a "theory ofmind." Although there is some discrepancy as to the
exact age at which children acquire this "theory ofmind" understanding, most researchers
agree that it occurs some time between 2 and 5 years of age, and most argue that the shift
to a representational theory ofmind occurs shortly after the child reaches 4 years of age.
In addition to false belief tasks, a large amount of data supporting preschool
children's increasingly psychological and abstract understanding of others has come from
studies of children's everyday speech in social interactions (Bartsch & Wellman, 1995;
Bretherton & Beeghly, 1982; Brown, Donelan-Mcall, & Dunn, 1996; Brown & Dunn,
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1992; 1996; Dunn, 1988; 1994; Dunn & Brown, 1991; 1994; Dunn, Brown, & Beardsall,
1991; Dunn, Brown & Slomkowski, 1991; Dunn, Brown, Slomkowski, Tesla, &
Youngblade, 1991; Dunn & Slomkowski, 1992; Wellman & Bartsch, 1994; Wellman,
Harris, Baneljee, & Sinclair, 1995). Notable in this respect is Judy Dunn and associates'
well-coordinated observations ofyoung children's interactions with parents, siblings, and
peers in their homes. Although there is some controversy about whether or not the type
ofunderstanding expressed in children's everyday talk is equivalent to that tapped by
experimental studies (see in particular, Astington & Olson, 1995; Bruner, 1995; Lewis,
1993; Raver & Leadbeater, 1993), it is important to note that the exact same naturalistic
data have been examined by various researchers, most ofwhom uphold the general
developmental progression reported by the experimental studies (see in particular,
Astington, 1993, Bartsch & Wellman, 1995; Wellman & Bartsch, 1994; Wellman, Harris,
Baneljee, & Sinclair, 1995).
It appears that around the same time that children pass the traditional false belief
tasks (i.e., around 4 years of age), they also start to use language to express the concepts
of thoughts, beliefs, mistaken beliefs, and imaginings to describe the internal worlds of
people, worlds that may be different from reality. In addition, children begin to use their
own and others' belief states as frameworks to explain and understand behavior. Bartsch
and Wellman (1995) use this evidence ofchildren's knowledge of the mind from
everyday conversations as well as experimental data to describe what they call a "Belief-
Desire Psychology," which they argue becomes more elaborated throughout middle
childhood. By about 6 years of age, children can understand that people may have
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separate .or different interpretations of the same situation or that different perspectives or
different types of infonnation about the same event may cause people to have different
understandings or beliefs about it.
Bartsch and Wellman's description ofthe development ofbelief-desire
psychology is corroborated and further expanded by Chandler's description of an
"interpretive theory ofmind" (Chandler & Lalonde, 1996). Chandler and Lalonde argue
that children begin to understand that people may have different interpretations of similar
infonnation--stemming from their ability to take different simultaneous perspectives on
the world, and to understand that characters' understanding and interpretations of
situations is dependent on their particular perspectives. For example, when children have
an interpretive theory ofmind, they can understand that two people looking at the same
partially-obstructed drawing can both make different, but wrong guesses about what the
drawing might be, although they both have exactly the same infonnation in front ofthem.
At the same time, children can also pass "second-order false belief tasks" in which the
child must understand how one character represents the thoughts or beliefs of a second
character. This level of understanding also relates to Flavell's (1992) Level 2
perspective-taking skill, in which children can represent both their own and another's
different visual perspective at the same time. Thus, children's belief-desire psychology
begins with the ability to understand that other people have mental representations that
can be discrepant from reality, and gradually evolves into the ability to compare multiple
distinct representations of reality, and understand how different minds may construct
different representations of reality.
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A. 2. Desire-Belief Psychology. Although children are considered to have a
. .
mature theory ofmind when they can understand the representational nature ofbelief at
the level ofbelief-desire psychology as described above, many researchers argue that
false beliefunderstanding is not acquired in "all-or-none" fashion at children's fourth
birthdays (Flavell & Miller, 1998). Instead, they argue that false beliefunderstanding is
the culmination of earlier stages at which children understand some things about the
mind, but not the representational nature ofbeliefs in particular (e.g., Astington &
Gopnik, 1991; Bartsch & Wellman, 1995; Wellman 1990; 1991; Wellman & Bartsch,
1994).
According to Bartsch and Wellman's model, children around the age of3 acquire
what they call a "Desire-BeliefPsychology." Although these children do not pass false
belief tasks, children at this level use belief terms occasionally in their everyday speech in
reference to .both themselves and others; and if asked to explain a character's actions, they
may even (but rarely) mention the character's thoughts and beliefs. If children at this
level are explicitly given a character's beliefin a simplified false belieftask, they can use
this knowledge to explain or predict the character's behavior (Bartsch & Wellman, 1995).
For example, when children are told a story about a boy who lost his puppy, then told that
the puppy could be in the garage or under the porch, plus told that the boy thinks that his
puppy is in the garage, 3-year-olds will correctly predict that the boy will look in the
garage (and not under the porch) for his puppy. Children in this stage can also link
sources of information to knowledge states (e.g., looking leads to seeing; seeing leads to
knowing; Astington, 1993; Flavell & Miller, 1998). But when closely examined,
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children's uses ofbelieftenns are not equivalent to the adult conception of these tenns.
For example, Astington (1993) and Bartsch and Wellman (1995) argue that although 3-
year-oIds can represent the concept ofbelief (they can understand that people think things
and believe things), they do not understand the representational nature ofbelief (and thus
they cannot comprehend that beliefs can be false, or correctly distinguish between correct
and false beliefs). Instead, when children possess a desire-beliefpsychology, they cannot
really separate belief from desire in order to correctly predict or explain actions, but rely
primarily on desire to understand the causes of actions, hence the label "Desire-Belief
Psychology" as opposed to the higher level, "Belief-Desire Psychology." Astington
(1993) further argues that children first use tenns like "think" and "believe" to refer to
successful representations that match the world in a positive way (or what adults would
call "knowledge") and cannot correctly distinguish reality from belief states or
understand that several people may have more than one discrepant belief. In short,
children with a desire-beliefpsychology have an early understanding about others'
beliefs, but do not use beliefunderstanding as a framework to explain and predict others'
actions (and do not pass false belief tasks). Instead, children with a desire-belief
psychology rely primarily on their understanding of desire to understand and predict
others' behavior.
A.3. Simple Desire Psychology. Still some researchers argue that young
children have an understanding that others have desires (just like themselves), and can
use this understanding to explain and predict actions and outcomes of actions even before
they turn 3. Specifically, Wellman (1990; 1991; Bartsch & Wellman, 1995) argues that
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prior to children's acquisition of desire-belief psychology, children use what he calls a
"Simple Desire Psychology." However, he argues that, unlike the higher levels of
children's "theories ofmind," simple desire psychology is non-representational, and thus
~s not really a "theory" about the mind (Wellman, 1990). He suggests that 2-year-olds
can understand that people desire things in the world, just as they do, but do not represent
desire itself as a representational mental state. In contrast, older children represent desire,
and eventually, belief, as mental states in the minds of themselves and others. Though it
is difficult to tease apart how younger children's non-representational understanding of
desire is different from older children's representational understanding, a large amount of
experimental and naturalistic data confinn that 2-year-old children can understand and
talk about their own and others' desires and emotions (both ofwhich are considered to be
non-representational mental states at this level), but do not mention other mental states
like thinking, dreaming, imagining, and the like. Other studies (e.g., Astington &
Gopnik, 1991) have confirmed that 2-year-old children explain characters' actions by
referring to their desire, and understand that outcomes ofdesires are linked with
emotions. (For example, 2-year-olds can understand that a character will be happy if she
gets what she wanted; but sad if she gets an equally pleasant, but not desired object.)
However, children do not go beyond "Simple Desire" to further explain or predict
behavior.
Naturalistic data also support these claims for 2-year-olds' developing knowledge
about others' simple internal states. Several studies have reported that around 2 years of
age, children begin to refer to the simple internal states ofother people. Shortly after
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children begin using simple object and action terms, they begin to include verbs of
perception (e.g., look, see, hear), emotion (e.g., happy, sad), and desire (e.g., want, like)
(Bartsch & Wellman, 1995, Bretherton & Beeghly, 1982; Huttenlocher & Smiley, 1990;
Shatz, Wellman, & Silber, 1983; Smiley & Huttenlocher, 1989). In addition to simple
use of these words to label their own internal states, toddlers begin to label others'
internal states (especially in emotionally-laden situations), to contrast their own internal
states with those of others, and to link actions with desire and intention words (Brown &
Dunn, 1991).
...
These results are further corroborated by experimental studies of early person
perception suggesting that young children are capable ofunderstanding psychological and
comparative person descriptions. For example, Bullock and Liitkenhaus (1990)
demonstrated that toddlers (by 24 months) perform significantly better than chance in
-correctly matching descriptions ofcharacters' emotions in short stories with pictorial
representations (e.g., matching verbal descriptions of "happy" or "sad" characters to
pictorial depictions of a happy face or sad face) suggesting that toddlers can understand
others' emotions. In short, converging evidence from experimental and naturalistic tasks
suggests that beginning at about 2 years of age, children begin to understand that people
have desires, emotions, and perceptions, and that people act because of desires, and react
emotionally because ofconsequences.
B. Summary. Evidence from both naturalistic speech data and experimental
tasks (false belieftasks and variations thereof) demonstrates that young preschool
children do not conceive ofpersons merely in terms of actions and external features, as
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their character representations reported by narrative research would suggest. Instead,
beginning around 2 years, children gradually develop more sophisticated conceptions of
the mental lives ofother people. The general consensus is that this progression occurs in
three major stages (Bartsch & Wellman, 1995; Flavell & Miller, 1998; Nelson, 1996).
During the first stage, "Simple Desire Psychology," 2-year-olds seem capable of
understanding themselves and others as psychological beings, with perceptions,
emotions, and desires. In addition, 2-year-olds use their understanding of desire to
explain and predict actions and can link -emotions to outcomes ofdesires, although their
understanding of desire is nonrepresentational. In the second stage, "Desire-Belief
Psychology," 3-year-olds begin to talk about beliefs in their everyday speech, but still
rely primarily on desires (which children begin to understand as representational mental
states) to explain and predict others' behavior, because they do not yet have a
representational understanding ofbelief. Finally, in the third stage, "Belief-Desire
Psychology," 4-year-olds are said to have a full-blown "theory ofmind" by which they
can understand the representational activities ofthe mind (like thinking, believing,
imagining and dreaming), and link perceptions, desires, beliefs, actions, and emotions to
understand why people behave as they do.
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IV. Age Discrepancy Between Character Representation in Narrative Research and
Social Understanding/Theory-of-Mind Research: Why the Difference?
This physical-to-psychological or action-to-thought shift in children's
understanding of themselves and others during early childhood stands in stark contrast to
evidence from studies of children's narrative development, which suggest that children do
not begin to explicitly represent characters as psychological beings until they are between
7 and 9 years of age. As discussed earlier, narrative researchers have argued that
children's character representations focus primarily on actions and external features until .
well into middle childhood, when there seems to be a shift to descriptions that go
"beneath the skin," as Flavell, Miller, and Miller call it (1993, p. 202). At this point,
narrative research has reported that children's character representations begin to include
descriptions of traits, motivations, feelings, thoughts, beliefs, plans, and coordinations of
internal states with actions.
It should be noted that the pattern of shift, from physical-to-psychological or from
action-to-thought, is similar in both bodies of research. However, the rather large age
discrepancy between them begs for attention and explanation. Specifically, why is it that
young children demonstrate sophisticated knowledge about their own and others'
psychological worlds both in their everyday speech and in experimental tasks during the
preschool years, and yet narrative research suggests that they fail to explicitly represent
this knowledge in their portrayals of story characters until between the ages of 7 and 10?
I will now tum to consider several possible explanations for this age discrepancy.
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A. Possible Explanations
A. 1. Implicit vs. Explicit Knowledge and the Demands of Storytelling. One
possible answer to this question is that the type ofunderstanding expressed by
preschoolers in everyday interactions, or necessary for young children to pass Theory-of-
Mind tasks (and thus necessary for researchers to credit the child with a representational
and mentalistic conception ofpersons), may be considerably less sophisticated than the
understanding made explicit in their character representations in narratives. It may be
that the type ofunderstanding expressed in early conversations, for example, is largely
possible because ofstrong interpsychological support from adults, older siblings, or
peers. Likewise, traditional Theory-of-Mind tasks may tap an implicit type of
understanding that is not equivalent to that expressed in children's explicit
representations of character.
This line of argument has been considered recently by researchers interested in
delineating the various forms ofknowledge each task requires. Raver and Leadbeater
(1993) argue that children's precocious uses of mental terms in their everyday
interactions with adults, older siblings, and peers is possible because ofthe strong support
of the social situation. They argue that Theory-of-Mind tasks tap a somewhat more
explicit form ofknowledge that is unsupported by familiar others in social contexts.
However, Nelson, Plesa, and Henseler (1998) go further to suggest that even Theory-of-
Mind tasks do not require children to construct representations of others' mental states on
their own. Instead, they argue that for children to pass false belief tasks, they must
simply use a particular form of interpretive skills that allows them to follow the story they
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are being told. According to Nelson et aI., true "theory ofmind" construction occurs
when children begin to construct their own narratives. Independent narrative construction
may be a significantly more challenging task than either interpersonal conversation or
false belief tasks.
A similar argument is taken up by Nicolopoulou's (1999) demonstration ofthe
importance of storytelling for language development. Nicolopoulou argues that narrative
is particularly suited to promoting children's "decontextualized" language skills because
it requires children to portray social worlds and characters within them using only words,
without the support or the assumption of shared knowledge ofmore expert adults or peers
(or without experimental supports). This is what Wells (1985, 1986) means when he says
that stories are distinctively "self-contextualizing" (1985, p. 253).
In this vein, narrative researchers have postulated that the demands of storytelling
inhibit children's ability to express their social understanding through their narratives. In
her attempt to address this problem, Stein (1988) suggests:
. Although young children have acquired substantial amounts ofknowledge about
social contexts and the structure ofpersonal and physical causality, they may not
have acquired enough knowledge to understand many of the features associated
with the adult conception of a good story. . . . The fact that young children are
proficient at understanding many core concepts associated with personal and .
physical causality does not guarantee an elaborated understanding ofthe story
concept (pp.282-283).
Basically, Stein proposes that children are incapable ofincorporating their sophisticated
knowledge about the social world into their stories because they do not have the skills (or
structural knowledge) to tell a good story. Stein supports her position by demonstrating
that when children were asked ·specifically about story characters' thoughts, feelings, and
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motivations, preschoolers were capable of giving correct answers. However, they did not
include this infonnation when asked to tell their own stories (Stein & Levine, 1989).
Shapiro and Hudson (1991) showed that some kindergarten children were capable of
representing ~imple character descriptions, goal states, and internal responses, when they
were given explicit problem-resolution picture sequences and asked to tell a story about
them. However, even these character portrayals were rare for the kindergartners, but
became more frequent for first graders, and were common for children of8 or 9 years of
age. Shapiro and Hudson concluded that children are capable of including these
structural elements in their stories if given enough support, such as through picture
sequences. They argued that the demands ofproduction for unaided storytelling (what
they call "storymaking," p. 961) are too high for young children to express what they may
(implicitly) know about story structure (and therefore, character representations) in their
own stories.
Other researchers go even further to suggest that the demands ofcreating fictional
narratives, in particular, inhibit children from portraying characters in sophisticated,
psychological ways (Kemper, 1986; Nelson, 1996). They point to evidence of children's
ability to represent their own and others' emotions and desires in reconstructing
emotional real life events (e.g., Stein & Levine, 1989) as well as in scripts (Nelson,
----------1996). Kemper (1986) concludes that although preschool children are capable of talking
about others' plans, mental states, and motivations in everyday talk and script
construction, t~ese are "largely absent in the stories told by young children" (p. 18).
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If one accepts that the demands of storytelling are far greater than those of
conversation or experimental tasks, which is certainly plausible, then one would expect
that children's abilities to portray complex characters in stories should lag behind the
knowledge of others' mental states that children demonstrate in social understanding and
Theory-of-Mind research. However, the size of the gap between their performance on
these two types oftasks (ages 2 to 5 for social understanding vs. ages 7 to 10 for
narrative) is considerably larger than one would expect on these grounds alone. Hence,
other possible explanations must be explored.
A. 2. Story Elicitation Techniques May Restrict Character Representation.
In order to lessen the demands of storytelling on young children (as well as to make
elicited stories more uniform, and thus more easily comparable by structural criteria)
narrative r~searchers have designed various story elicitation techniques, such as the use of
various wordless picture books, picture sequences, story-topics or story-stems to help
children tell a story. However, the usefulness of these elicitation techniques is debatable,
even in terms ofhow well they assist children in telling stories. As the previous review
of several narrative studies has indicated, children did describe the physical expressions
ofcharacters in picture sequences by the use of emotional words, but rarely went beyond
what was represented in the pictures to describe characters' emotions, motivations, or
thoughts (e.g., Bamberg & Damrad-Frye, 1994; Bennan & Slobin, 1994; Trabasso &
Nickels, 1992; Yussen, 1982). It may be argued that instead ofhelping children with the
task of storytelling, these elicitation techniques may actually hinder children's character
representations by limiting the number of characters children may choose to represent,
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and constraining them to portray characters only in terms of the events, emotions, or other
characteristics depicted in pictures. In fact, Nelson (1996) argues that researchers
increase the demands of storytelling, and decrease children's creativity and involvement
in the activity when they elicit stories from children using prefabricated story-stems,
topics, or picture books. Therefore, by my point ofview, these methods decrease the
chances that children will incorporate complex character portrayals in their stories.
Instead, ifchildren are allowed to represent characters and events freely, they may
actually be able to produce richer character representations than what is currently
attributed to them.
This line of argument has been vigorously pursued by Nicolopoulou (l996a,
1997a), who has demonstrated that placing children's narrative activity into the everyday
context ofpreschool classroom cultures allows children to produce much more
sophisticated stories than those generated by experimental elicitation techniques.
Nicolopoulou argues that situating storytelling within children's social world ofpeer
culture provides them with more resources to produce sophisticated narratives, and gives
them a purpose (the audience oftheir peers) for which to tell stories. The influence of
peer culture on children's storytelling has proven to generate stories that are not only
more sophisticated, but also more revealing of children's own concerns, imaginations,
and peer group dynamics. When the social impetus and resources for storytelling are
absent, children will produce much less sophisticated narratives. The present stu~y
builds on these arguments and utilizes this same methodology.
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A. 3. Structural Categories May Disregard Children's Own Strategies for
Character Representation. Regardless ofwhether or not story elicitation techniques
using pictures books, story-stems, or story-topics actually restrict children's abilities to
represent characters in complex and psychological ways, it is true that storytelling
requires children to represent their social understanding in an explicit, fonnal fashion,
largely without social or experimental supports (Nicolopoulou, 1999). In short, when
children tell stories, they are on their own, and must recreate a social world and characters
within it using only language, and without the support of other people or experimental
cues. Hence, one might expect that a physical-to-psychological shift in children's social
understanding as expressed in everyday conversations and experimental tasks might
precede a similar shift in their story character representations. However, the argument of
the present study concurs with Astington (1990), who has argued that this lag should not
be as large as the studies ofnarrative development seem to suggest.
In fact, Astington (1990) proposes that children should be able to represent
psychologically complex characters in their stories about the same time that they acquire
a theory of mind, that is, beginning around the age of4. Although Astington seems to
recognize the necessity for children to be competent with language and storytelling skills,
she nonetheless argues that the knowledge necessary to represent psychologically
complex characters is the same knowledge that is tapped by Theory-of-Mind tasks. In
accord with the argument advanced in this paper, Astington speculates that one reason
there is no evidence for preschool children's development of complex character
representations is the structuralist interests, and therefore, the structural categories used in
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most studies of children's narrative development. She calls the structuralist claim
regarding the absence of complex character portrayals "quite remarkable", and says that
even a "cursory" reading ofPitcher and Prelinger's (1963) corpus reveals preschool
children's increasing ability to represent characters' psychological worlds (p. 167). It
should be noted here, however, that Pitcher and Prelinger (1963) did analyze their corpus
explicitly for children's representations of stoiy characters' mental states, and found
none. This discrepancy was not addressed by Astington (1990), nor did she go further to
analyze the Pitcher and Prelinger corpus in any systematic way.
B. Argument for Young Children's Ability to Represent Complex
Characters: Landscape of Consciousness in Preschool Children's Stories
In her argument for children's abilities to comprehend and produce stories which
include descriptions of characters' internalworlds, Astington (1990) applies Bruner's
(1986) model ofthe landscapes ofnarrative to suggest what children must learn to do in
order to become good storytellers. According to Bruner (1986), narrative thought is
divided into two landscapes: action and consciousness. For the landscape of action, the
plot of the story is central. Actions, goals, situations and instruments (i.e., the structural
criteria for narrative) make up the landscape of action. The landscape of consciousness
involves the internal world of the story's characters. For Bruner, both landscapes are
necessary, but it is the incorporation of consciousness into action that marks a good story.
Bruner argues that the integration of action and consciousness through character
representation becomes the storyteller's expression of a conception or model ofpersons
in society. Such a concept ofpersonhood expressed by children's character
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representations may not include everything they are capable ofunder~tandingabout
themselves or others; but it should represent what is most salient or important in their
conceptions, or working models, of self and other.
Astington (1990) argues primarilyfrom evidence of children's developing
capacity to appreciate the landscape of consciousness in the stories they hear (and uses
the example ofreading her daughter the story ofThe emperor's new clothes between ages
2 and 4). She adds that preschool children's abilities to produce stories that incorporate
the landscape of consciousness into character portrayal should not lag far behind their
comprehension ofcharacters' internal worlds in the stories they hear. Astington
postulates that children should acquire the ability to attribute certain mental states, like
belief or desire, to their characters, and should flesh out their characters' internal worlds
by the characters' own expressions (through dialogue with other characters) beginning
around age 4. She concludes that an investigation of children's incorporation ofthe
landscape of consciousness into their own stories is needed.
Interestingly, Feldman et al.'s (1993) previously reviewed study was aimed
directly at determining whether people of different ages incorporated the landscape of
consciousness into the landscape of action, and found that, contrary to Astington's
suggestions, even 10- to 12-year-olds included only limited elements ofcharacters'
intentions in their story interpretations. One possible explanation for this result is that the
methodology in the Feldman et al. study restricted the participants' representations of
characters. In line with the argument of this study, more sophisticated character
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representations may be generated through children's spontaneous storytelling in
meaningful and socially situated contexts.
Though up to now no study has systematically analyzed children's spontaneous,
socially-situated narratives to determine whether, and if so, when and how children
incorporate the landscape of consciousness into the ~andscape of action through their
representation of characters, some support for the suggestion that character representation
might be more sophisticated in spontaneous narratives comes from Wolf, Rygh, and
Altshuler's (1984) study on the development ofyoung children's pretend play. However,
this study cannot be directly compared to narrative research, because pretend play is a
significantly simpler (or context-dependent, in contrast to self-contextualizing) task than
narrative. As in everyday social interactions, or in experimental tasks, children do not
have to use only language to recreate social worlds or characters in pretend play. Instead,
children can rely on the support of toy props to fill in the details that must be explicitly
described in narrative. (For a similar argument, see Nicolopoulou, 1999.) However, in
. the absence of any other supporting data, Wolfet al.' s detailed analysis ofpretend play
serves to suggest that young children may have the capacity to represent psychologically
complex characters in their narratives.
Wolf et al. (1984) assessed the pretend play ofyoung children longitudinally
between the ages of 1 and 5 years in the context ofboth spontaneous and elicited play
with toy props. In spontaneous play periods, the children were provided with a set of
toys (figurine dolls and setting pieces) and were simply encouraged to playas they
wished. In the elicited play periods, children were provided with the same toys, but the
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\experimenter either enacted a short episode with the toys, and then asked the children to
reenact the same episode, or she started an episode by providing an interesting setting,
.
and then asked the child to continue the episode. The children's utterances during the
play with the toy props were analyzed for what Wolf et al. called "levels ofrepresentation
ofhuman action" (p. 202), or what can be considered the increasing complexity of
character representation in the children's pretend play.
Wolf et al. (1984) described five levels of increasing complexity of character
representation in their data (p. 202): At the first level, the children did not consider the
dolls to be actors, but rather treated them as recipients of the child's own actions. At the
second level, the children ascribed actions and speech to the doll, but no internal states.
At the third level, children ascribed sensations, perceptions, and physiological states to
the doll. At the fourth level, children represented the dolls' emotions, judgments between
right and wrong, obligations, and relations like friendship or rivalry. Finally, at the fifth
level, children characterized the doll with thought, planning, and wondering. The results
of this investigation showed that most children represented the figures at all levels by the
age of 5. More specifically, most children in the study had reached Level 3 by 2 Y2 years
of age, most had reached Level 4 by 3 'l2, and all ofthe children had reached levelS by
age 4 'l2. It should be noted, however, that the results reflect the highest level achieved
by one play-episode per child, and do not necessarily reflect the children's primary or
most stable strategy for character representation.
In broad terms, these results seem to parallel the gradual physical-to-
psychological shift outlined above for children's development of a theory ofmind. In
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addition, Wolf et al. (1984) also found interesting gender differences in their data.
Although all the children in the sample developed more psychological figurine
representations with age, the boys in this sample represented their figurines primarily in
terms of their actions and goal sequences, while girls referred more often and more
.,
explicitly to their figurine's internal states. These gender differences suggest that boys
and girls may hold different concepti<?nsofperson in their pretend play, a possibility that
will also be pursued in the current study.
Unfortunately, like Fox's studies ofcharacter representation in older children
described earlier (Fox, 1987,1990, 1991), the levels presented in Wolf et al. 's (1984)
study also appear to simply describe the patterns in the data and do not to represent
theoretically motivated models of children's conceptions ofpersonhood. The result is
that Wolfet al.'s levels also tend to conflate children's representations of internal states
with types of character relations and situations, which need to be considered as
conceptually and developmentally separate dimensions. The present study will separate
these dimensions, and will also attempt to offer a theoretically-motivated model of
character representation.
Although Wolf et al.'s (1984) study can provide some basic intuitions about how
young children's representations of story characters might develop, it does not provide a
very detailed model to follow for an analysis of children's stories. First, it ,is not clear
that the development ofchildren's character representation in fictional narratives will be
identical to that of the development in pretend play. Although a correspondence in
direction (physical-to-psychological, or action-to-thought) can be expected, children's
character portrayals may begin to develop slightly later, or may develop more slowly than
the children's figurine representations. In addition, the content ofchildren's character
representations in narratives, and the details of sequencing would be expected to be
somewhat different. In fact, the current study argues that children's story character
portrayals represent their developing conceptions ofpersonhood in a way that has not
- .
been captured by current research. For example, the experimental and naturalistic data in
Theory-of-Mind and social understanding research show other qualitative shifts in
children's understanding of themselves and others which are not represented in Wolfet
al.'s (1984) model. Wolfs highest level attempts to capture some ofthe elements
involved in children's "theories ofmind," but conflates that knowledge with several other
dimensions. Therefore, a more careful conceptualization of children's understanding of
personhood is needed to guide the analysis ofcharacter representation in young children's
narratives. The search for such a model will be taken up in the next section.
c. Summary
To some extent, a kernel of truth can be found in each ofthe previously outlined
possible explanations for the apparent late development ofchildren's character portrayals
in their narratives. The task demands for children to express their social understanding in
terms ofcharacter representation in fictional narratives are far greater than those in
pretend play, everyday discourse, and experimental Theory-of-Mind tasks. Unlike the
context-dependency ofthese tasks, narratives are self-contextualizing. In storytelling,
children must create the social context and manipulate characters within it. Furthermore,
in storytelling, children must explicitly represent their knowledge about people's internal
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states in a far more abstract, formal (self-contextualizing) way. This requires that
children have considerable expertise not only with understanding themselves and others,
but also with the decontextualized.language skills needed for storytelling. Thus, in order
for children to represent psychologically complex characters in their stories, their own
social understanding must be somewhat sophisticated and explicit in form. Thus, the
types of characters children portray in their stories may be one ofthe best indicators of
what aspects of the social world are most salient, important, or best understood by the
child. Given these considerations, it is expected that children's character representations
will lag behind the level ofknowledge they can express in less demanding, or more
supportive situations. However this lag should not be as great as previous narrative
research has claimed.
In fact, the view ofnarrative.espoused in this study is in accord with that of
several researchers who have argued that narrative is a primary tool for humans'
construction of identity and for understanding and representing the social world (Bruner,
1986; Engel, 1995; Miller, 1994; Miller, Mintz, Hoogstra, Fung, & Potts, 1992; Miller,
Potts, Fung, Hoogstra, & Mintz,1990; Nelson, 1995, Nicolopoulou, 1996a; 1997a; 1997b
Nicolopoulou, Scales, & Weintraub, 1994; Nicolopoulou & Weintraub, 1998). As such,
in accordance with Astington's (1990) view, children should begin to represent human
intentionality and thought in their narratives soon after they acquire the necessary
language skills and storytelling ability to do so. An important research question for both
narrative and cognitive developmental research, then, is the exact timing ofchildren's
incorporation ofthe landscape ofconsciousness into the stories they tell, and what forms
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this landscape takes with development. These are the questions the study attempts to
address.
In order to understand the development ofyoung children's capacities to represent
complex, psychological story characters that reflect their conceptions ofpersons, children
must be allowed to use narratives as the powerful tool that they are, situated in social
context. That is, the elicitation ofstories by topics, stems, or picture books, will likely
constrain children to represent characters in a very simple form, primarily through actions
and simple descriptions. However, ifchildren are allowed and encouraged to tell their
own stories in everyday and important social contexts, children may be more likely to use
the storytelling situation to construct and refine, as well as to express, their own
developing models ofpersonhood.
The methodology used in this study takes these considerations seriously, and
views the process and setting of children's storytelling activities as an important part of
proper narrative analysis. The stories analyzed in this study were all told spontaneously
by preschoolers in their classroom settings as part of a storytelling and story-acting
practice first pioneered by Vivian Paley (1984, 1986, 1990). In this method of story
generation, children had an opportunity to dictate stories to their teachers every day, as
part of their morning free play activities, for the purpose ofacting them out later with
their friends. When the children chose to tell stories, the teachers transcribed the stories
as the children told them. At the end of the day, all the stories told during that day were
read aloud to the entire class during "circle time." During the reading of each story, the
authors, along with friends chosen by them to act out the story's characters, performed a
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"drama" of each story. The result of this practice is that storytelling and story-acting
become a central part of the preschool classrooms' culture, and children spontaneously
use narrative as a tool to communicate and achieve social-relational goals, as well as to
share their social knowledge in the "'real world' oftheir classroom miniculture."
(Nicolopoulou, 1997a, p. 203). Stories generated by this procedure have been analyzed
extensively by Nicolopoulou (1996a; 1996b; 1997a; 1997b; 1999; Nicolopoulou, Scales,
& Weintraub, 1994; Nicolopoulou & Weintraub, 1998). She has demonstrated that
children's spontaneous, socially-situated stories are far more sophisticated than those
analyzed by most narrative research studies. This result may be due to children's
enthusiastic involvement in, and collaborative support of, each others' narratives.
Experimental elicitation techniques, which do not motivate children's involvement or
creative energy, may be particularly susceptible to the self-contextualizing task demands
ofnarrative. On the other hand, when storytelling is socially-situated in the classroom,
children can use peer support and encouragement to lessen the burden ofrecreating a
social world with language. The stories analyzed in this study were generated through
this activity and were obtained from Nicolopoulou' s corpus. Thus, I expect that these
stories will yield character portrayals that most accurately represent the children's
developing conceptions ofpersonhood, as opposed to those found in narrative research
that is based on more impoverished and limited social contexts for the generation of
stories.
In accord with this point is the argument that narrative analyses should not
evaluate young children's stories simply for their resemblance (or, more precisely, for
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their lack of resemblance) to adult-based models of story well-formedness, but should
aim to uncover the strategies that the children themselves use to represent characters.
Structural analysis is unlikely to uncover these strategies because, as argued earlier, it
evaluates children's stories primarily in terms of sequences ofevents, or specific kinds of
character representation that may be absent from young children's stories, or unimportant
from children's perspectives (Nicolopoulou, 1996b, 1997a, 1997b, 1998.) Therefore, the
goal of any study ofthe development on character representation in young children's
narratives must be based on children's socially situated narratives and must be geared
toward uncovering the developing models ofpersonhood represented by children's story
characters. Thus, a prediction ofthis study is that, ifchildren are encouraged to tell their
own fictional stories in regular and familiar social contexts, and if these stories are
analyzed sensitively to uncover children's own strategies for character representation,
then a developmental progression starting from more physical and action-based character
representations, to more psychological character representations, is expected to occur
much earlier than has been previously demonstrated by narrative research.
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v. Toward a Model of Person Conception in Children's Character Representations
-
While the general pattern ofdevelopment in young children's story character
representations might be expected to roughly approximate the milestones ofdevelopment
already mapped out by research on children's social understanding, there also may be
some important differences in children's representations of story characters that current
models of children's "theories ofmind" or social understanding cannot account for.
Specifically, children's portrayals of story characters may include aspects not considered
by social understanding or Theory-of-Mind research, because in portraying characters
children must represent their holistic conceptions ofpersons situated and acting in social
contexts, and not simply particular isolated elements or dimensions. Because in telling a
story, children have to recreate both a social world and characters within it, their
character representations may not match the dimensions delineated in research of early
social understanding or that of the "representational theory ofmind." Instead, children's
character representations may express a more holistic account of the most salient or
important characteristics of children's conceptions of themselves and others. In short,
children's character representations may be a kind of explicit working model of
personhood. The development of character representation, then, may be seen as a
development of children's explicit models ofpersons, seen as situated and acting in social
contexts. Furthermore, the timing as well as the specific details in the development of
character representation may be somewhat different than the sequence described so far by
research on children's social understanding and "theories ofmind."
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Specifically, Theory-of-Mind models tend to lump together the development of
concepts of action, perception, emotion, desire; and intention in the first stage of
children's developing theory ofmind, the so called "Simple Desire Psychology." Most
summaries of children's early understanding ofmental concepts use naturalistic speech
data and experimental tasks to demonstrate that children begin to express an
understanding ofthese concepts by the age of 2, or shortly after children begin to use
language. In contrast, because storytelling is a much more difficult, decontextualized,
task in which children must use language alone to represent a social world and to
manipulate characters, it is not expected that children's representations of story characters
will develop in the same fashion as their everyday speech. Instead, a more gradual
development from more simple, action-based characteristics to increasingly social and
psychological ones is expected. However, Theory-of-Mind research cannot alone provide
an adequate model for this type of development.
The more sophisticated levels of children's "theories ofmind," "Desire-Belief'
:b
and "Belief-Desire," are plagued less by this tendency to conflate several aspects of social
understanding. Models ofmore mature "theories ofmind" give more detailed accounts of
the order of development for the concepts of desire and belief, and their relations to each
other, to action, and to other mental concepts, like perception and emotion. Therefore,
the "Desire-Belief' and "Belief-Desire" psychology models may be more useful to
describe children's more sophisticated models ofcharacter representation, but, again, do
not include an adequate model for other social and mental dimensions included in story
character representations.
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Likewise, social understanding research based on children's early social
interactions also lacks a detail~d developmental picture ofearly forms of social
understanding for application to young children's simplest models of character
representation. Research in this area often simply describes when and in what situations
children talk about various dimensions of their social understanding. In general, social
understanding research lacks an overall guiding framework for organizing the
development ofvarious dimensions of social understanding. Compounding this problem
is the fact that the origins of a good deal of early social understanding are hypothesized to
be in infancy, before babies can talk. So, questions of content, order, and causal relations
remain for the development of children's ~derstanding ofconcepts like action,
perception, communication, desire, intention, and emotion. Even less clear is how these
early implicit forms of social understanding are transformed into explicit concepts in
children's developing models of character representation. (For a similar argument, see
Dunn, 1988.)
As pointed to earlier, character representation may be a more explicit or abstract
. form ofknowledge than the knowledge tapped by experimental Theory-of-Mind tasks or
supported by social interaction of children in their families. The type of explicit
knowledge ofpersonhood represented in children's portrayals of story characters cannot
be adequately modeled by accounts of children's developing social understanding.
However, one might argue that research on children's descriptions ofthemselves and
others has attempted to describe children's explicit conceptions ofwhat are the most
central or important aspects of themselves and others throughout childhood. For this
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reason, I will turn to review this research and evaluate its usefulness for modeling the
development of character representation in young children's narratives.
A. Children's Conceptions of Person through Self- and Other-Descriptions
A. 1. Self- and Other-Descriptions in Childhood. Though generally considered
to be separate yet parallel areas ofresearch, traditional work in children's self-concepts
and what is known as "person perception" have both utilized a basic description paradigm
in which children are asked to describe themselves (e.g., "I am a person who...") or
friends ("What is the most important thing to know about. ..") through free response, or
semi-structured interviews (e.g., Baremboim, 1981; Livesley & Bromley, 1973; Mohr,
1978; Montemayor & Eisen, 1977; Peevers and Secord, 1973). These techniques have
been aimed at uncovering the most important elements of children's person concepts
during different age periods (Damon & Hart, 1988; Schaffer, 1996). Although some
researchers argue that the development of self- vs. other-understanding are separate
processes (Damon & Hart, 1984), a great deal of evidence suggests that these two types
of social understanding follow similar developmental patterns (Flavell, Miller, & Miller,
1993; Gopnik, 1993; Tomasello, Kruger & Ratner, 1993). Therefore, I will describe the
development of children's self- and other-descriptions, and evaluate its usefulness as an
application for children's developing models ofcharacter representation.,
Like narrative and social understanding research reviewed above, traditional
research on children's self- and other-descriptions has uncovered an external-to-internal,
action-to-psychological, or concrete-to-abstract trend in development. (For reviews, see
Damon & Hart, 1982; 1988; Flavell, Miller, & Miller, 1993; Harter, 1983; 1998; Ruble &
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Dweck, 1995; Schaffer, 1996; Shantz, 1983.) In general, these studies have found that
when preschoolers are asked to describe themselves or their friends, they give
descriptions that center on physical characteristics and possessions (Damon & Hart, .
1988; Selman, 1980). In free description tasks, preschool children are likely to describe
external features and possessions like, " 1have brown eyes" or common activities like, "I
play soccer" (Keller, Ford, & Meachum, 1978). Peevers and Secord (1973) suggest that
children produce "peripheral" descriptions of external appearance or common activities,
and do not describe "central" (or psychological) features until after age 7. Preschoolers
have also been reported to confuse psychological processes and characteristics to physical
body parts, or to attribute psychological processes (e.g., thinking) to physical body parts
(e.g., "my mouth thinks," Broughton, 1978).
During middle and late childhood, children's person descriptions are focused on
their own and others' habitual actions, capabilities, and relationships with others. Like
the pattern ofdevelopment in character representation reported in narrative research,
evidence from children's self- and other-descriptions also points to an important shift in
children's person descriptions around age 8 (Broughton, 1978; Flavell, Miller, & Miller,
1993; Peevers & Secord, 1973, Selman, 1980, Shantz, 1983). Beginning around this
time, children begin to separate descriptions ofmental states and intentions from physical
characteristics (for instance, children's describe others' personality traits ["She is
friendly"] rather than habitual actions ["She gives me things"]). Beginning late in middle
childhood and continuing through adolescence, children's self- and other-descriptions
become more abstract, or psychological in nature (e.g., "He may appear a joker in class
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because ofhis unique style of eloquence, but in reality he feels a deep responsibility
toward the advancement ofhis own personal knowledge" [Flavell, Miller, & Miller,
1993, p. 203]). Early adolescents characterize themselves and others in terms of social
relationships and stable personality traits. During late adolescence and throughout
adulthood, individuals focus primarily on psychological aspects: solidifying belief
systems, moral values and philosophy, and inner thought processes. It appears, then, that
this research supports the late shift in narrative research, and does not add any new
insight on how to conceptualize the development ofyoung children's conceptions of
personhood as portrayed through their character representations.
A. 2. Recent Research in Self Concept. In recent years, there have been some
important changes in the study ofchildren's conceptions ofthemselves and others.
"Person perception" research has given way to social understanding and Theory-of-Mind
research, which has primarily focused on preschool children. Research on children's
developing self concepts has abandoned the paradigms which sought to simply uncover
the qualitative shifts in the content of self-concepts to exploring more cognitive models of
the changing structure of self concepts (Harter, 1998). Many newer models of self-
,
concept development have taken into account the evidence from social understanding and
Theory-of-Mind research which suggests that very young children begin to understand
the activities of the mind. Further, researchers have gone beyond simple self- and other-
description techniques to probe children's understanding of themselves and others using
specific questions and various experimental techniques that do not simply rely on the
child's ability to produce descriptions through language (e.g., Damon & Hart, 1982,
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1988). The trend in current work in se1f- and other-understanding assumes that children
of all ages include elements ofphysical features, activities, dispositional traits, and
psychological states in their self- and other-concepts and focuses on determining the
relative weight or complexity of each type of selfknowledge for different age groups and
how children ofdifferent ages relate conflicting or separate types of selfknowledge into a
self-concept (Damon & Hart, 1982; 1988; Harter, 1998).
Thus, unlike traditional self-concept research, more recent approaches have
assumed that preschool children incorporate their knowledge about the mind into their
conceptions of self. Eder (1990) argued that 3-to-7-year-olds include knowledge about
their mental states and traits, and can use this knowledge to make comparisons between
themselves and others. She asked children to compare themselves to puppets' self(e.g.,
"I am a person who..." descriptions. When asked to make a forced choice (either like or
not like the puppet), even 3 Y2 year-old children could correctly identify their own and
others' psychological dispositions. Damon and Hart (1988) argue that children from
preschool through adolescence incorporate aspects ofphysical appearance, regular
activities, social competencies, and psychological characteristics into their self-concepts,
and view children's development as the shifts in the relative saliency and their gradual
elaboration ofparticular dimensions with age. Results from these types of analyses
portray the development in self-concept as progressing from simple to differentiated,
from inconsistent to consistent, from absolute to comparative, and from public to private
throughout childhood (Schaffer, 199~).
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Furthennore, current work in self-concept development has become increasingly
cognitive in emphasis, and has applied principles ofcognitive development and theory
construction to the concept of self. For example, in describing the development ofperson
understanding in middle childhood, Rotenberg (1982) has developed the idea of
"character constancy" to describe children's increasing ability to describe themselves and
others in terms of stable personality characteristics and traits. Rotenberg places the onset
of character constancy during the middle childhood period and credits its emergence to
the child's cognitive shift to concrete operations and the ability to conserve. Baremboim
(1981) illustrated how qualitative shifts in children's person perception are complexified
by children's increasing abilities to make comparisons. He depicted children's
descriptions of others as progressing from simple action descriptions, to action
comparisons, to psychological descriptions, and finally, to psychological comparisons.
Recently, Harter (1996, 1998) has applied Fischer's (1980) model ofskill development to
model the developing structure of self-concept. Though these models provide some
important infonnation about how the development of self-concept is related to cognitive
development in general, current research in self-concept development (like Theory-of-
Mind R~search in social understanding) fails to map the development of children's
concepts of persons as situated within social and moral contexts. (For a similar
argument, see Shweder, Goodnow, Hatano, .LeVine, Markus, & Miller, 1998.)
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A. 3. Can Models of Personhood from Self- and Other Descriptions be Useful
Models for the Development of Character Representation in Young Children's
Narratives? In the briefreview ofperson concept developm~nt in self- and other-
concept development research above, two primary research emphases were outlined.
Traditional self-and other-description research originally sought to delineate the major
changes in the content of children's person concept. The general progression outlined by
this research resembles the direction ofdevelopment already outlined for earlier
development in children's social understanding and with regard to both the pattern and
timing of development in older children's character representations reported by narrative
research. However, the development ofchildren's self- and other-descriptions cannot
serve as a satisfactory model for understanding the development ofyoung children's
character representations in narratives. These traditional analyses ofchildren's self- and
other-descriptions have yielded a picture of a sweeping shift between physical or action-
based models ofperson to psychological or social-comparative models, just like the
pattern already described in older children's character representations in narrative
research. Thus, traditional accounts of person concept development do not add new
, insight to how children's narrative representations of character should develop, and are
especially inadequate for modeling how young children incorporate their conceptions of
personhood into character representations.
Unfortunately, the more recent emphasis in applying cognitive models to the
development ofself-concept has not yielded a more coherent account ofhow children's
models ofpersonhood gradually change, or how the concepts in earlier models lead to the
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development of newer or more integrative ones. These cognitively oriented models of
self-concept development do not attempt to address how children see themselves or
others participating as subject or agent in a social world. In summary, neither traditional
nor current work in children's developing self- or other-concepts can adequately model
the development ofcharacter representation in preschool children's models. Both lack a
general conception ofpersons as a meaningful entity, or as part of a social world, and
thus, both are inadequate to model character representation in narratives.
B. Other Models of the Development of Person Conception
Although research in social understanding and self- and other-descriptions falls
short of giving an adequate model for understanding how preschool children might
develop the character representations in the stories they tell, some broader, more
theoretical models of the development ofperson concepts offer some insight into how the
representation ofcharacter might further develop. For example, William James' model of
selfconcept (as presented in Harter, 1998) describes three hierarchical levels of self
concept (material, social, and spiritual) which can be adapted to fit the development of
character representation. At the lowest level ofJames' self concept is the "material self'
which is comprised of the physical body and material possessions. The "social self' is
that which interacts with and is perceived by others. Finally, the "spiritual self' is made
up of enduring dispositional traits, psychological states, thoughts, and moral reasoning.
These basic levels provide a broad and intuitive outline that encompasses the physical-to-
psychological shift traced in each ofthe research areas reviewed so far, yet motivates and
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allows further specification appropriate for children's character representations at each
level.
Another general model ofperson concept development was recently proposed by
Tomasello, Kruger, and Ratner (1993) as an orienting framework for integrating the
various findings of social cognition research. Tomasello et al. argued that children go
through three major shifts in their models ofperson concept development. Beginning at
about 9 months, children construct a model ofpeople as "intentional agents," and
understand people's intentions for acting by increasingly sophisticated ways of
communicating with them, by learning to take others' visual perspectives, and by gauging
others' emotional reactions to events. Around 4 years of age, children's concept of
persons as "mental agents" emerges, and includes children's development of a "theory of
mind" to understand and predict others' actions. Finally, between the ages of6 and 7,
children begin to conceive of others as "reflective agents" (p. 503). That is, children
begin to understand that other people have specific concepts for understanding third
parties' actions in terms of desires and beliefs. Although Tomasello et al. 's model is also
relatively unelaborated in terms of the specific developments within each level, it
provides a broad and motivated framework for predicting how young children might
gradually develop their character representations.
A third model of development ofperson concept was formulated outside the field
ofpsychology by the philosopher Am6lie Rorty (1988), but is applicable to the current
study because it describes changing conceptions ofpersonhood as revealed through
character development, albeit in the case of the history ofwestem fiction. Rorty
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delineates several levels ofdevelopment in her model, but I will focus on the ones most
applicable to this study. In particular, Rorty traces a progression in literature, from the
representation of"characters" to "persons." According to Rorty, "characters" begin to
.have some personality and capacities for social interaction: they have basic psychological
processes (the capacity to see, feel, or communicate) and can make choices, but have no
thought life apart from actions or physiological capabilities. In contrast, "persons" have
psychological worlds and identities that can be separated from their actions and external
features. While Rorty's levels of"character" and "person" are useful categories for
modeling children's character representations, as Rorty herself points out, "characters"
are already somewhat sophisticated representations; therefore, a simpler level of
representation is needed to capture children's earliest development. To address this need,
I have adapted Bal's (1985) narratological delineation of"actors" as opposed to what she
calls "characters." In Bal's model, "actors" are the simplest level in fiction who only act
or are acted upon, and are not further delineated. In short, I have loosely adapted and
integrated Rorty's and Bal's models to arrive at tmee categories of "actors," "characters,"
and "persons," which I further define to create a model of character representation that
will capture children's changing conceptions ofpersonhood.
As with the two other models ofperson conceptions just presented, this basic
typology of character representation spells out the nature of important shifts in
conceptions ofpersons from simple actors to social and psychological beings who
interact with others in a social world. The models reviewed are further integrated and
adapted to include findings from studies on children's developing social understanding
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VI. The Current Study: A Model of the Development of Character Representation
in Young Children's Narratives
This section more precisely defines the basic model of ch~acter representation,
which attempts to capture the major shifts in children's character representations from
"actors" to "characters" to "persons," as loosely adapted from _Rorty (1988) and Bal
(1983). This model defines "actors" as non-psychological beings who only act or are
acted upon, and who may be described in terms oftheir external or public characteristics.
"Characters" become more delineated and simply psychological by their basic internal
capacities for interaction or their simple motivations for action, interaction, and reaction.
"Persons" are defined as thinkers, who have mental representations which become
coordinated with actions. A second model further elaborates this basic one, by using
intuitions from the other theoretical models reviewed, and by integrating them with
specific findings from research on children's early social understanding and "theories of
mind," when applicable.
Still, the levels of the more elaborated model cannot be justified strictly on the
basis ofthe developmental research previously reviewed. As argued earlier, research on
early social understanding does not adequately delineate a trajectory of development that
is readily available for application to children's character representations, nor does it
adequately address children's gradually developing conceptions ofpersons as actors in
social worlds. Rather, social understanding research appears to oversimplify what may
be a sequence ofmore differentiated developments by simply lumping together the
development of children's understanding ofperception, intentionality, and emotion at the
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beginning of early childhood (around 2 years). In this respect, there is a conceptual
deficit in the psychological literature for explaining children's development at the
intermediate levels ofcharacter representations (i.e., at the level of "character"). To
. address this need, I have adapted Searle's (1983) philosophical account of increasingly .
sophisticated levels of Intentionality or "aboutness" (p. 1). The reader should note here
that "Intentionality" with an uppercase "I" refers to a larger set of internal states that can
have propositional content or be "aoout"something in the world. This "Intentionality"
includes the lower case "intentionality" which refers to the desire to perfonn an action. I
will continue to distinguish these two concepts by capitalizing the first one, in accordance
with the philosophical tradition.
According to Searle, simple actions are not necessarily "about" anything (that is,
the objects of action are not propositional in the way that Intentional states are; e.g., "I
know that tomorrow is Friday"). Therefore, "actors" in the current model are not viewed
as intentional beings in any way. However, "characters" are defined by increasing
Intentionality, both in action (i.e., the lay person's definition of"intentionality," which is
modeled as one developmental trajectory) and in consciousness (i.e., other basic
psychological states that may have propositional objects, which are modeled as a second
developmental trajectory). At the lowest level, ch~acters' Intentionality is only implicit:
the intentionality of action is implicit in the kinds of actions characters perfonn, the way
they perfonn them, or the simple reasons for which they perfonn them. The lowest level
of Intentionality in basic psychological states is implicit in characters ability to see, feel,
or communicate. (These may all have propositional objects; e.g., I can see that, feel that,
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and say~...) At the second level ofIntentionality or "aboutness," characters either
respond through action or emotion to situations and events. These reactions are
Intentional because they are either actions or emotions "about" something. At the highest
level of Intentionality, characters' prior explicit intentions for action are marked as end
goals, explicit attempts, blocking of intentions, or by use of explicitly intentional desire
state words.
Of course, representations of"persons" must also be Intentional in nature, but
persons' Intentionality is complexified by the portrayal of"representational" mental
states, that are by definition Intentional, but also have a "direction of fit" to the world in
that they may either be matched or mismatched to the state of affairs in the real world
(Searle, 1983, p. 8). Research on children's developing "theories ofmind" have taken
these complexities into account; therefore, the previously delineated models of
"representational theories ofmind" will be adapted to model the development of
children's character representations at the basic level of "persons."
A. Presentation of the Model: Progression from Actors to Characters to
Persons
The levels of the more basic model ofcharacter representation attempt to capture
the important shifts delineated in the theoretical model ofperson conceptions outlined
above; the more elaborated model attempts to define these shifts in terms ofpreschoolers'
own strategies for representing increasingly psychologically sophisticated story
characters. As mentioned above, the more elaborated model also expands the category of
"characters" into two developmental trajectories of Intentionality outlined briefly above;
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that is, into the landscapes of Intention-in-Action (A) and Consciousness (B). In general,
,
both the basic and more elaborated models of the development of character representation
in young children's stories are very loosely adapted from Rorty's (1988) and Bal's (1983)
. typology of character development to show how young children progress from
representing "actors," who are defined by their actions, to portraying "characters," who
are simply individuated with basic psychological capacities for interactions, to "persons,"
who are truly cognitive beings, with psychological motivations and representations of the
world.
In the more elaborated model, the basic category of"Actors" develops in two
levels. In Level I, actors simply act or are acted upon; they are not further elaborated. In
Level 2, actors begin to be fleshed out through descriptions of their physical features or
other observable and public characteristics. The basic category of"Characters"
develops in three levels, each ofwhich is delineated into the subtypes ofIntention-in-
Action (A) or Consciousness (B). First, characters are attributed capacities ofbasic
psychological processes in Level 3 through their ability to perceive others and events in
the world as well as to communicate (3B) or through their implicit intentions for actions
(3A). In Level 4, characters react to events in the social world, either emotionally (4B) or
through action (4A). In LevelS, characters act based on their explicit intentions (4A) or
explicit desires states (4B). Finally, the basic category of"Persons" develops in two
levels, in which children begin to integrate the landscapes ofIntention-in-Action (A) and
Consciousness (B) to attribute persons with mental states that correspond to their
developing "theories ofmind." In Level 6, persons have representational desire and
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belief states, but act based only on their desires, which are portrayed through children's
use of a "desire-beliefpsychology." That is, Level 6 persons may be portrayed as having
some knowledge about the world, or gaining information from various sources, though
this information does not seem to affect their actions. In contrast, Level 7 persons are
portrayed through children's use of a "belief-desire psychology" and act based on
information they obtain, false-beliefs, or plans they make about the future. (See
Appendix for a schematic overview ofthese levels.)
B. Gender Differences in Character Representations: The Landscapes of
Intention-in-Action and Consciousness
B. 1. Further Predictions of the Model. In addition to the proposed progression
from less to more psychological character representations as outlined above, the basic
category of"characters" was delineated to capture girls' and boys' different models of
character representation: the boys toward motivated action, and the girls toward explicit .
consciousness. The intuition that boys and girls may represent qualitatively different
types of characters, and thus may be working from different models ofpersonhood are
modeled by Bruner's two landscapes ofnarrative: (A) Action (which I have called
"lntention-in-Action" for purposes ofclarity) and (B) Consciousness. The landscape of
Consciousness attempts to model girls' tendency to represent characters as whole,
socially-connected persons by fleshing out their characters' psychological realities in
terms ofperceptions, communications, emotions, and explicit mental states, like desire
and belief. On the other hand, Intention-in-Action attempts to model boys' focus on
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characters' actions and intentions for acting, and construing their internal worlds in tenns
of these actions.
B. 2. Evidence for Gender Differences from the Research Literature. The
suggestion that girls and boys may have gender-differentiated models ofpersonhood is
strongly supported by empirical evidence from the research literature in other areas. The
prediction of gender differences in children's character representations stems·from
evidence of gender differences of figurine representations in children's pretend play
(Tarullo, 1994; Wolf, 1987) as well as evidence for strong gender-based genres and
strategies in preschool children's spontaneous fictional narratives (Libby & Aries, 1989;
Nicolopoulou, 1996a; 1996b; 1997a; 1997b; 1997c; Nicolopoulou, Scales, & Weintraub,
1994; NicolopOl.tlou & Weintraub, 1998). In addition, there have been various findings
for gender differences in children's social understanding and Theory-of-Mind tasks. For
instance, several studies of children's use of emotion tenns in everyday conversations
have provided evidence that girls may develop an earlier and more sophisticated
understanding of emotion than do boys (Adams, Kuebli, Boyle, & Fivush, 1995; Brown,
Donelan-McCall & Dunn, 1992; Brown & Dunn, 1996; Dunn, Slomkowski, Tesla, et aI.,
1991; Kuebli, Butler, & Fivush, 1995).
One rarely cited and up to now unreplicated finding of gender differences in
standard Theory-of-Mind tasks was reported in Frith and Happe's (1996) summary of
some preliminary data by Happe and Frith (1995). The results of this study suggested
that 4-year-old girls outperfonned boys in Theory-of-Mind tasks, and thus, may acquire a
"representational theory ofmind" first. Although this finding has lacked support from
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other Theory-of-Mind tasks (e.g., Astington, 1995; Taylor & Carlson, 1997), research on
children's understanding ofreal vs. apparent emotions and emotion display rules suggests
that girls .understand the difference between the appearance and reality of emotions before
boys (Banerjee, 1991; Joshi & Maclean, 1994). These findings relate both to girls' more
developed understanding ofemotions as well as to more sophisticated theory ofmind,
because it is assumed that false beliefunderstanding and the ability to distinguish
between appearance and reality (as in the real vs. apparent emotions tasks) are both
derived from the same underlying "representational theory ofmind" (Sabbaugh &
Callanan, 1998). In addition, the ability to distinguish between appearance and reality
has been found to be correlated to the ability to pass false belief tasks when
experimentally tested (Taylor & Carlson, 1997).
These gender difference findings for differentiating real from apparent emotions
suggest that girls may have a more detailed understanding of emotions, as well as an
earlier grasp ofthe representational nature of others' minds during early childhood.
Gender differences in children's conceptions of themselves and others may extend
beyond early childhood, as demonstrated by boys' and girls' increasingly dissimilar self-
and other-descriptions (Montemayor & Eisen, 1977; Rosenberg & Simmons, 1975).
Hence, a prediction for the development ofgender-differentiated models of character
representation by preschool boys and girls is supported both by research focusing on
children's narratives, as well as research on children's development of social
understanding, including children's understanding of emotions, their development of a
"theory ofmi.nd," and later self- and other-descriptions.
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C. Summary: Outline of the Present Study
The model presented above outlines a proposed developmental progression for
character representation in the narratives of3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds. It attempts to
integrate theoretical models ofpersonhood as situated in social contexts with evidence
from research studies that have traced children's development of increasingly
sophisticated knowledge about others' mental lives. Specifically, the model attempts to
loosely adapt and integrate Rorty's (1988), Bal's (1983), Searle's (1983), and Bruner's
(1986) typologies in order to model young children's character representations in
narrative. Based on this proposed model, children's character representations should
progress from "Actors," portrayed in terms of simple strings of actions and descriptions
ofobservable traits, to "Characters," portrayed as interacting, reacting, and choosing to
act in a social world, to "Persons," portrayed as acting based on mental representations of
their social worlds.
In addition, this study follows strong suggestions ofgender differences from
research on children's developing social understanding as well as narrative research to
propose that, although girls and boys will both follow this extemal-to-intemal, or action-
to-psychological progression in their character representations, they will follow different
paths along the way. Specifically, Bruner's (1986) division of two landscapes of
narrative was used to model (1) girls' emphasis on their characters' "Consciousness," or
models ofpersons as social and psychological beings who are connected to others, and
(2) boys' emphasis on their characters' "Intention-in-Action," or models ofpersons that
emphasize actions.
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Based on these models, girls' character representations should reflect and
elaborate more elements ofthe landscape ~f consciousness, including characters'
perceptions, sensations, and communications with others (Level 3A), emotional reactions
(LeveI4A), and more explicit references to characters' mental states overall (Level5A, 6,
and 7). On the other hand, boys' character representations should focus more on
characters' actions (Levell), physical characteristics and possessions (Level 2), as well
as increasingly explicit intentions-in-action (Levels 3B, 4B, and 5B).
However, by the end ofthe preschool years, both boys and girls are expected to
incorporate references to characters' mental states into their portrayals of actions. Hence,
the differentiation between Intention-in-Action (A) and Consciousness (B) is dissolved as
children begin to use a "theory ofmind" to represent "persons" at the higher levels of the
model; that is, as children learn the art of storytelling. Though girls' and boys'
trajectories of the development ofcharacter representations in their narratives may be
different, their overall development toward the highest levels of the model represents
their increasing abilities to integrate the landscape of action and the landscape of
conSCIOusness.
Importantly, however, this developmental progression can be expected for
preschoolers only when they are allowed to tell stories for their own purposes on an
everyday basis. The review ofnarrative research presented above has attempted to
demonstrate that unless this is the case, children do not include characters' motivations or
internal states in their narratives until much later, sometime between the ages of 7 and lO.
Experimental narrative elicitation techniques used to generate young children's stories
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often restrict children's character representations. This is also the case beyond childhood,
into adulthood. In response to these problems, I have followed a research program
initiated by Nicolopoulou (1996a; 1996b; 1997a; 1997b; 1997c; 1998; 1999;
Nicolopoulou, Scales, & Weintraub, 1994; Nicolopoulou & Weintraub, 1998) which
analyzes stories collected in preschool classrooms utilizing a storytelling and story-acting
practice that encourages children to tell stories to each other, and thl:1s enhances narrative
development. Children's narratives generated by this activity are ripe for analyses that
focus on children's own strategies and interests in socially-situated storytelling, including
the analysis of character representations. Though narrative research has shown little
interest in children's own strategies for character representation, and has found no
evidence for its development in early childhood, this study argues that, given the chance,
preschool children can and will develop complex and psychological character
representations in their narratives which reflect their developing conceptions of
personhood.
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METHOD
A. Participants
Thirty preschool children who attended a half-day nursery school in western
Massachusetts participated in this study. The children were selected from four preschool
classes (two from 1992-93 and two from 1994-95 school years) so that they would
comprise three age groups of equal size at the beginning of the school year: early 3's,
early 4's, late 4's, 5 girls and 5 boys per age group.
At the beginning of the school year, the age ranges of the children were as
follows: The 3-year-old girls ranged from 3,2 to 3,3 (mean [M] age = 3,3) and the 3-year-
old boys ranged from 3,1 to 3,5 eM = 3,3); the 4-year-old girls ranged from 4,1 to 4,4 (M
=4,3) and the 4-year-old boys ranged from 4,0 to 4,2 (M =4,1); the 5-year-old girls
ranged from 4,7 to 4,11 (M = 4,9); and the 5-year-old boys ranged from 4,7 to 4,11 (M =
4,9). As can be seen from the mean ages of the oldest group, these children started out as
late 4's and most turned 5 during the fall semester. (These were children whose birthdays
occurred after their school districts' cut-off dates and therefore were ineligible to enter
kindergarten.) However, these children will be referred to as "5-year-olds" and will be
used to compare the development of character representation in the stories at three age
groups. The children in this study were primarily from middle- to upper-middle-class
families, whose parents were mostly professionals or academics.
B. Data Collection
The stories analyzed here were drawn from a larger, multi-year project (using data
gathered from the 1992 to 1995 school years) that has studied the development of
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children's narrative activity in its social context (Nicolopoulou, 1996a; 1996b; 1997a;
. 1997b; 1997c; 1998; 1999; Nicolopoulou, Scales, & Weintraub, 1994; Nicolopoulou &
Weintraub, 1998). These stories were generated using the storytelling and story-acting
technique originally pioneered by Vivian Paley (1986, 1988, 1990) which was carried out
in the preschool classrooms for the entire length oftheir school year (from September to
June). Each day, as part of each classroom's regular morning free play activities, any
child could choose to dictate a story to a teacher, who wrote it down as the child told it.
The children were allowed to tell any kind of story and portray any number ofcharacters
they wished. During "circle time," all the child authors for that day acted out their stories
with friends whom they chose as story characters while the teacher read the transcribed
stories aloud. Nicolopoulou and her research assistants visited the classrooms about once
a week to collect ethnographic observations, and then at the end ofthe year she also
collected the entire body of stories for analysis. The 30 children selected for analysis in
the present stUdy told a total of 570 stories (range = 9 to 42 stories per child, mean
number of stories per child = 19).
C. Coding
Each of the children's stories was coded using the more elaborated, seven-level
coding scheme constructed to evaluate the type, depth, and complexity of character
representations. (Again, see Appendix for a schematic overview of the three-level basic
typology and the seven-level elaborated typology.) Each story was coded for the highest
Representation Level portrayed for any character. As outlined earlier, these levels
describe a hypothesized developmental progression in children's character representation
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from the most simple portrayals of isolated actions to increasingly more psychological
portrayals and greater intercoordination of characters.
In addition, the Levels 3 through 5 were further subdivided into two types:
Intention-in-Action (A) and Consciousness (B), which delineate the development of two
gender-related models of character representation. Character portrayals falling into
Levels 3 through 5 were assigned one ofthese types based on their content. There were a
few stories that contained elements ofboth Intention-in-Action (A) and Consciousness
(B). These stories were coded as "Mixed."
Intercoder reliability was established by having two coders (the author and a
trained undergraduate) independently code approximately 20% of the total corpus; this
subsample comprised all the stories told by one girl and one boy, respectively, chosen
randomly from each age group. The second coder was blind to the gender and age of the
children, as well as to the hypotheses and predictions of the study. This coder was
instructed to code each story to its highest elaborated level ofcharacter representation,
using the coding scheme below as a guide. The rate of agreement between the two coders
was 89%, a satisfactory figure. All but one ofthe disagreements were resolved easily
through discussion; in most cases they proved to be due to the second coder's lack of
familiarity with some details of the coding system. There was only one story (1% of the
double-coded subsample) for which there was a genuine difference of opinion, involving
a difference of one level (in the elaborated categories) between the judgments of the
coders; this case was resolved by coding the story at the lower level of representation .
level.
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After each child's stories was coded to a Character Representation Level and
Type{if applicable), the mean proportion of stories falling into each Level and Type was .
calculated separately for fall (September through December) and spring (January through
June) semesters. In addition, the broader categories of"Actors," "Characters," and
"Persons" were derived from the more elaborated coding scheme by simply collapsing
the subordinate elaborated levels under each basic category.
D. Character Representation Levels
I. Actors
Actors are simply defined by their actions; they act or are acted upon.
Levell. Action Only: Actors are represented simply by actions and are not
further described:
The turtles came and Slash.
Slash fights.
\
The turtles fight.
The turtles win.
Level 2. Simple Descriptions: Actors are beginning to be fleshed out through
externally identifiable or public characteristics. These include physical traits (e.g., T-Rex
has sharp teeth); or names or ages (e.g., The girl's name was Clara and she was 14 years
old); or possessions (e.g., A cat had a hat); or locations (e.g., The king and the queen
lived in that castle); or simple evaluative descriptions (e.g., The bear was nice). At times,
actors' stereotypic or habitual actions may be adjectivized as descriptions (e.g., Flying
skeletons came).
Once upon a time there was a clown
who had a pet mouse
and he lived in a castle with the mouse.
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And he lived with a king, and a queen, and a prince, and a princess, too.
And they had a dog
and. the dog snored.
And they went for a walk.
II. Characters
Characters begin to be gradually individuated as entities with basic psychological
capacities. At this level, characters are differentiated into two types: (A) Intention-in-
Action, in which characters have an intentional stance through their actions; and (B)
Consciousness, in which characters manifest basic psychological capacities for
interaction in the (social) world.
Level3A. Implicit Intention: Characters are represented in terms of their
implicit intentions for actions. For example, ·characters' regular actions may be marked
as agentive (e.g., The ghost went to bed by himself); or characters may use tools to
accomplish actions (e.g., He fights using his powers); or may perform intentional actions
that strongly imply that they mean to accomplish them (e.g., They were waiting in the
batmobile); or have implicit goals or purposes for carrying out actions (e.g., She met her
friend for a sleepover). Finally, in accordance with research on children's understanding
of intentionality, ifcharacters' actions are marked by necessity ("had to") rather than
choice ("tried to"), the characters' actions are considered to be implicitly intentional
(Shultz, 1991). In addition, ifcharacters' actions are precipitated by one oftheir own
traits (e.g., He googoo at school because he is so silly), these actions are also considered
to be implicitly intentional.
First there was a tarantula.
Then Spiderman tamed the tarantula.
Then the bad guys. (There's 11 bad guys.)
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Then Spiderman makes himself tum into 11 Spidermen
and they fight 11 fights.
Type 3B. Simple Psychological Capacity for Interaction: Characters begin to
have the capacity for basic-level psychological interactions or a point ofview·on the
world in that they can see (e.g., Leah watched them go); or feel things (e.g., He was so
hungry); or communicate (basically meaningless communication, e.g., Then Spiderman
said, "Yahoo!"); or exhibit simple undirected emotions (e.g., They were all happy).
Once upon a time there were two Dorothys and one Toto.
And they lived together in a nice house.
And then they walked in the woods together.
In the woods they meet a little bear.
.And in the woods, after they found a little bear,
They found a little guinea pig.
Level 4. Characters are further individuated in that they are represented as
reacting to situations and events either through their Action Responses (4A) or
Emotional Reactions (4B). (At this level, the coding begins to incorporate not just
simple clauses but relations between th~m.)
Type 4A. Reactive Intentionality: Characters respond through actions to
situations and events. These actions tend to be linked to their precipitating causes by
"so" or "because" (e.g., The ghosts are still alive, so they just left the ghosts alone).
Once upon a time there was a bat
and it lived in a cave.
And every time animals came
the bat ate it.
Then the bat saw that their friend bats were in trouble
so they had a battle.
The End.
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Type 4B. Emotional Reaction: Characters have emotional reactions to situations
and events or may also make evaluative·statements (e.g., The cat liked to read books. It
said, "This is fun!").
Once upon a time there was a little girl.
There was a kingdom.
It had a princess, a queen, a king.
They had one baby,
and then a wolfcame
and ate the baby.
And the queen was very sad.
The End.
LevelS. Characters are further individuated by children's use of a "Simple Desire
Psychology." This can be accomplished in two ways: through representations of
characters' explicit intentions-in-action (5A) and explicit desire states (5B).
Level SA. Explicit Intention-in-Action: Characters have explicit intentions for
action that are portrayed by markers such as "tried to" or "getting ready to" (e.g., They
tried to find their Hippo); or by goal-oriented action sequences (e.g., Then a bunny came
to rescue the kittens); or by their spoken commands that express characters' desires or
intentions (e.g., He said, "Shoot the Ninja Turtles, Rocksteady!"). In accordance with
research on children's understanding of intentionality, characters' explicit intentionality
can also be expressed through the explicit negation of their intentions (Shultz, 1991). For
example, this can be portrayed by the blocking of characters' intentions (e.g., He couldn't
kill the lion) or by characters' actions that happen by accident (e.g., By accident, he
touched the circle).
Once upon a time there once was a little kitty who had a mommy.
He was lucky to have a mommy
because he loved his mama very much.
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And he never went to sleep without his mama kissing him.
And whenever bad guys came
they hid under the quilt or something to keep them safe.
so they wouldn't get stolen.
"Baby kitty ~d I" said the mom.
And he loved his mom very much.
Level5B. Explicit Desire States: Characters have explicit psychological desire
states such as "wants" and "wishes" (e.g., She found another princess who wanted to live
with her).
Once upon a time a prince lived in a castle.
And one night a woman came
and offered him a rose.
But the prince didn't want the rose
and she turned him into a beast.
And she put a spell on the castle and all who live there.
And in a town nearby there lived a man named Gaston and a beautiful girl named
Belle.
Gaston wanted to kill the beast.
And they went to the castle and killed the beast.
To be continued.
III. Persons
Persons are represented by higher psychological processes that are integrated with
actions. These higher psychological processes include persons' beliefs, knowledge,
dreams, and imaginings that are cognitive and representational in nature. Children
represent person by integrating the landscapes ofIntention-in-Action and Consciousness
by using their representational "theories ofmind" to coordinate persons' actions, explicit
intentions, and mental representations. (At this level, the coding tends to incorporate the
entire story.)
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Level 6. Desire-Belief Psychology: Persons are portrayed as having not only
explicit intentions and desires, but also thoughts and beliefs; however, their actions are
motivated by their desires alone, and not mediated by their thoughts or beliefs.
Once upon a time there was a bat family. And they spotted a monster. And then a
dragon came. The bats killed the dragon and then the dragon came alive. And the
bats and the dragon played together and then they became friends and then they
played all day. The monster said, "Let's go have something to eat." And· they
had a big feast. And they didn't know what to do, so they jumpe4 in the pond and
had a swim together. And they didn't know what to do after their swim, so they
began to play again, and· then finally they knew what to do. [And want to know
what they did?] They played hopscotch and then they went inside and had dinner
and they went to sleep. The End.
It should be noted that persons' mental representations may be portrayed without the use
ofmental state words (like "think" or "know"), but instead through persons' planning, or
communication of intentions, or asking permission, to accomplish a goal. These
activities are considered representational knowledge states because they imply future
sequences of actions that may be carried out if the appropriate conditions of satisfaction
are met. In fact, this is the representational definition of intentionality, according to
Searle (1983).
And he was stealing people's money
by scaring them with his poison arrow
Saying he was going to shoot them
if they didn't give him their money.
Level 7. Belief-Desire Psychology: Persons' beliefs and desires are coordinated
to motivate their actions. Persons' false beliefs may also be represented at this level.
So the Frisbee ran away
because he thought the ring would spy on him.
But the ring would not do that.
Or:
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Once upon a time there was a kingdom. There was a king and a queen and a
princess. One time they all went walking in the woods and they got lost. There
was a witch in their house. When they came home they said, "My, everything
looks different!" and the witch jumped out and said, "Surprise!" One time when
the little girl (princess) was sleeping, the witch corned into her room and scared
her and she waked up and the witch ran away and the girl said, "Oh, there's
nothing here." And the witch came back and knocked on her door. And there
was no one there, and she said, "Oh, there's no one knocking on my door either."
Later, when she woke up, she was terribly cranky in her room. She couldn't go to
school and this was her favorite day. She said, "Mom, it's really not my fault. A
witch corned in my room." But her mom didn't believe in witches. The end.
\
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
After all the children's stories were coded for the highest level (1 through 7) of
character representation depicted in the story, the proportion of stories falling into each of
the Levels, and Type (A or B) within level (when applicable), was calculated for each
child, for fall and spring semesters. In addition, proportions ofbasic level representations
(Actors, Characters, and Persons) were calculated by summing the proportions from each
of the elaborated levels within each basic level. (For example, proportions of "actors"
were equal to the summed proportions ofLevel 1 and Level 2 representations.) Finally,
the appropriate elaborated representation levels were also summed to analyze children's
use oftheir different levels of "theories ofmind." (For example, proportions of"Simple
Desire Psychology" were equal to the summed proportions of Level 3, 4, and 5
representations.)
Separate analyses ofvariance (ANOVAs) were performed on th~se sets of
proportions. The three ANOVAs were identical in design: four-way mixed factorial
ANOVAs, with semester (fall, spring) and levels (either basic, or elaborated, or Theory-
of-Mind levels) as the within factors, and gender (girls, boys) and age (3-, 4-, 5-year-olds)
as the between factors. Because mean proportions were used, the grand means for each
group summed to 100%, therefore the important results of the analyses are in the form of
interactions. An alpha level of .05 was adapted to test for statistical significance in all
analyses.
A. Basic Level Representations
The first analysis was performed on the proportions of children's representations
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of"actors," "characters," and "persons," the categories of the basic model of character
representation. Each child's proportions of stories falling into these basic categories for
the school year and the overall group means are depicted in Figures 1 through 6. A four-
way mixed factorial ANOVA was performed on the mean proportions with semester (fall,
spring) and the basic representation levels ("actor," "character," "person") as the within
factors, and gender (girls, boys) and age (3-, 4-, 5-year-olds) as the between factors. In
this analysis, the Age x Basic Level interaction was significant (E [4,48] = 9.84, 12 =
.00001), indicating that children developed more sophisticated character representations
with age. The Semester x Basic Level interaction was also significant (E [2,48] =4.6, 12 =
.01), indicating that the children also developed more sophisticated character
representations in the spring semester than in the fall. Finally, there was a significant
Gender x Basic Level interaction (E [2,48] = 8.11, 12 = .0009), indicating that boys and
girls followed different trajectories of development for these basic categories. A more
detailed and integrated summary of these results is presented next.
In the 3-year-old group, both boys and girls represented mostly simple "actors"
and some "characters/' and both boys and girls developed more "characters" and fewer
"actors" throughout the school year (see Table 1 for age group mean proportions).
However, gender differences were apparent from the beginning (see Table 2 or Figures 7
and 8 for age/gender/semester mean proportions). Girls began representing more
"characters" than boys in the fall semester (18% vs. 4%), whereas the boys represented
mostly actors (96%). And while boys developed some "characters" in the spring (16%),
girls still represented more "characters" (30%) than the boys. This shows that the boys'
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representations of"actors" d~creased between semesters (from 96% to 83%), while the
girls' proportions of"actors" did not decrease (72% to 70%); instead, the increase in
girls' representations of "characters" (from 18% to 30%) in the spring semester reflects a
decrease in their representation of"persons" between semesters (from 10% to 0%). This
decrease in 3-year-old girls' representations of"persons" can be explained by the fact that
three of the girls told about one story in the early fall semester that was clearly a retelling
of a familiar story, and thus contained representations of "persons" that were not found in
their later story creations. Even with this anomaly taken into account, the girls still
represented more "characters" with simple psychological capacities for interaction than
did the boys in both semesters, though the boys began to depict a few representations of
"characters" in the spring semester. Overall, 3-year-olds represented very few persons
(3%, see Table 1).
In the 4-year-old group, both boys and girls represented fewer simple "actors"
(56% vs. 80%) and more "characters" (35% vs. 17%) than did the 3-year-olds (see Table
1 for age group mean proportions.) But despite this basic similarity, there were two
interesting differences between the 4-year-old boys and girls (see Table 2 or Figures 7
and 8 for gender/age/semester mean proportions). First, while both the 4-year-old boys
began to portray more "characters" in the fall (31 %) than the 3-year-old boys had in the
spring (16%), the 4-year-old boys did not continue to develop any further. In contrast,
the 4-year-old girls portrayed about the same proportions of "characters" in the fall (33%)
as the 3-year-old girls had in the spring (30%), but shifted to portraying even more
characters during the spring semester (50%). Second, the 4-year-old girls began to
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consistently represent a few psychologically complex "persons" inJhe fail (11 %) and in
the spring (15%), but the boys represented "persons" rarely (2% for fall, and 8% for
spring). Overall, the 4-year-olds primarily developed more "character" representations
than the 3-year-olds, thus moving away from simple actions and descriptions, toward
individuating characters through depicting basic psychological capacities foi"interaction
as well as implicit intentions. However, 4-year-old girls showed more development than
the boys during the school year, coming to portray many more "characters" in the spring
semester. In addition, the girls began to represent a few psychological "persons" both
semesters (11% in the fall, 15% in the spring), while the boys represented even fewer (2%
in the fall, 8% in the spring).
In contrast, boys and girls in the 5-year-old group showed significant
development toward more "persons" (25% vs. 9%) and fewer representations of simple
"actors" (32% vs. 56%) as compared to the 4-year-olds (see Table 1 for age group mean
proportions). Once again, however, the specific pattern ofdevelopment during the school
year differed between the boys and girls (see Table 2 or Figures 7 and 8). While the 5-
year-old girls began to represent significantly more "persons" in the fall semester than the
4-year-olds did in the spring (33% vs. 15%), they did not continue to develop any further
(33% to 35%). Instead, their primary movement between semesters was an increase in
representing "characters" (from 46% to 60%) and a decrease in representing simple
"actors" (from 21% to 5%). The 5-year-old boys, on the other hand, did not significantly
increase their representations of "characters" above the level of the 4-year-old boys
throughout the year; instead, they represented more "persons" (from 8% to 24%) and
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fewer "actors" (from 60% to 42%) between semesters. Thus, while 5-year-old girls and
boys represented more "persons" overall, the girls primarily developed more
representations of "characters" between semesters, while the boys primarily developed
more representations of"persons." However, it is importanr'to note that despite this
difference in developt;nent between semesters, girls still represented more "characters"
and "persons" in both semesters than did the boys.
In sum, the development of the children's basic categories can be roughly
described as a shift in focus from "actors" at 3 years, to an increasing use of"characters"
at 4 and 5 years, to "persons" at 5 years. By 5 years of age, the children represented
"characters" more frequently than "actors" (see Table 1) and also began to represent
"persons" to a considerable degree. Importantly, however the rhythm ofthis
development was different for boys and girls. (1) In general, girls in every age group had
higher proportions ofboth "characters" and "persons" than the boys, while the boys in
every age group had higher proportions of "actors" than the girls. This difference became
particularly pronounced among the 4-year-olds during the spring semester: the girls
shifted to representing many more "characters" while the boys did not show much
development. And while the 5-year-old boys and girls developed considerably in
developing "characters" and "persons," the gap between the boys and girls held. (2) A
second overall difference was the girls' more pronounced focus in representing
"characters" than the boys. Even while the girls began to represent "persons"
consistently at 5 years, they also continued to increase their representations of
"characters." In contrast, the boys only increased their representations of "characters" .
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between the 3 -year-olds' spring semester and the 4-year-olds' fall semester; and they did
not continue to develop them further. Instead, the 5-year-old boys began to. represent
"persons" more consistently, but only in the spring semester. This overall pattern of
differences between the boys~and girls suggests that while·both developed toward more
psychological character representations with increasing age, the girls focused on
portraying their characters' mental worlds earlier and in larger proportions than did the
boys. Boys, on the other hand, retained higher proportions of"actors" as they moved to
increasingly more sophisticated representations. These differences may reflect the
development of two different models ofpersonhood in the narratives ofpreschool boys
and girls.
B. Elaborated Character Representation Levels
An even more differentiated view of the development ofchildren's character
representations was shown by the analysis of the more elaborated seven-level model,
which differentiates the basic levels discussed above. Each child's proportions of stories
falling into the elaborated levels for the school year and the overall group mean are
depicted in Figures 9 through 14. A four-way mixed factorial ANDVA was performed
on the mean proportions with semester (fall, spring) and the more elaborated
representation levels (Levels 1 through 7) as the within factors, and gender (girls, boys)
and age (3-, 4-, 5-year-olds) as the between factors. In general, the results of this
ANOVA support those from the basic level analysis. Like the tirst analysis, the Age x
Basic Level interaction was significant (F [12, 144] =4.58, 12 < 001) which indicates that
children developed more sophisticated character representations with age. Also like the
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first analysis, there was a significant Gender x Basic Level interaction (E [6,144] =3.74,
12 = .003), indicating that boys and girls showed different trajectories ofdevelopment for
these elaborated levels. However, the Semester x Level interaction was not significant
for this finer analysis, most likely due to the large range of elaborated character
representation levels portrayed by the children during each semester. While it is clear
from the first analysis that children did developed more complex representations as the, .
school year went on, here I will simplify the presentation by collapsing the results across
semesters.
The results of this more elaborated analysis showed that 3-year-olds' primary
mode of character representations, "actors," was mostly made up ofLevel 1
representation (actions only, 48%), with fewer Level 2 representations (actions and
external descriptions, 32%; see Table 3 for age group mean proportions). As can be seen
in Table 4 or Figure 15, the girls' earlier shift to representing "characters," demonstrated
by the previous analysis, was accomplished by their fewer Level 2 "actors" (22% vs. 42%
by the boys) and more Level 3 "characters" (20% vs. 5% by the boys). Neither 3-year-
old girls nor boys included character representations at any higher levels.
The proportion of4-year-olds' representations ofLevel 1"actors" decreased
significantly (from 48% to 25% overall, see Table 3) and Level 2 remained the same
(32% to 31% overall) as they began to represent more "characters." As can be seen in
Table 4 or Figure 15, the girls (who had begun to represent some Level 3 "characters" as
3-year-olds) began to also represent a few Level 4 "characters" (emotional and action
responses; 11% vs. 3% for the 3's) and Level 5 "characters" (explicit intention and desire,
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8% vs. 1% for the 3's). In contrast, the boys, besides representing "actors" (Levels'l and
2), began to represent a few Level 5 "characters" (from 3% at 3 years to 16% at 4), but
rarely represented Level 3 or 4 "characters." As the basic level analysis showed, only the
4-year-old girls began to represent "persons" in any substantial way. This analysis shows
that they began by using a "Desire-BeliefPsychology" (Level 6, from 3% at 3 years to
12% at 4 years), which portrays representational mental states and motivates actions
through explicit desires and goals. However, they did not integrate thoughts and beliefs
with actions, as Level 7 remained low.
The more elaborated analysis illuminates the 5-year-olds' shift to representing
soine "persons" by showing that girls decreased their representations ofLevel and Level
2 "actors" quite substantially as compared to the 4-year-old girls (Levell, from 22% to
4%; Level 2, from 24% to 9%). At the same time, the girls increased their
representations of "characters," particularly by portraying their explicit desires (Level 5,
from 8% to 21%). And while 4-year-olds girls had begun to represent "persons" using
only a "Desire-BeliefPsychology" (Level 6), the 5-year-old girls extended their
representations of "persons" by using a "BeliefDesire Psychology" (Level 7, 19%). In
comparison to the girls, the 5-year-old boys increased their representations of
"characters" only slightly, by portraying a few more Level 3 and 4 representations than
the 4-year-old boys. Instead, the boys shifted to representing "persons" by using a
"Belief-Desire Psychology" (Level 7, 12%), though they still represented fewer "persons"
than the girls, due to their continuing portrayal of"actors," which accounted for over half
of their stories.
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For the 5-year-old group overall, the most marked (albeit limited) transition was
toward both boys' and girls' increased representations ofpsychologically complex
"persons," particularly by their use of a "Belief-Desire Psychology" (Level 7). The most
prominent gender difference was the significant decrease in the girls' representation of
~evel 1 and 2 "actors" as compared to the boys' higher proportions at these levels. In
addition, girls continued to increase their representations of "characters" by producing
more Level 5 representations, while boys increased their representations ofLevels 3 and
4 very slightly, moving instead to represent "persons" at level 7.
These results flesh out the developmental picture provided by the more basic
analysis. To summarize these trends, 3-year-olds represented "actors" primarily through
their actions (Levell) and external descriptions (Level 2), but only the girls began to
represent "characters" by giving implicit intentions and basic psychological capacities for
interacting in the social world through perceptions, sensations, and communications
(Level 3). While 4-year-olds continued to represent many "actors," they also began to
represent "characters" more often. In particular, the girls continued to represent Level 3
"characters," but also began to portray reactions to events around them (Level 4) and
motivate characters' actions by portraying their explicit desires and intentions (Level 5).
In contrast, 4-year-old boys retained higher proportions of"actors" and only represented
"characters" at Level 5. In the 4-year-old group, only the girls began to represent
"persons" by using a "Desire-BeliefPsychology" (Level 6) to represent characters'
desires and beliefs, but coordinated only desires with actions. In the 5-year-old group,
the most significant overall development was the boys' and girls' representation of
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"persons",using a "Belief-Desire Psychology" (Level 7) to coordinate desires and beliefs
with actions, and the girls' dramatic decrease in representations ofsimple "actors" to
represent "characters" and "persons" equally as often.
. As the basic level analysis indicated, the overall trends in this more elaborated
analysis showed that while both boys and girls developed steadily from "actors" to
"characters" to "persons," the girls closely followed the hypothesized sequence of the
more elaborated levels while the boys tended to move less gradually from "actors"
(Levels 1 and 2) to representations of "characters" explicit intentions and desires (Level
5) to coordination of"persons" representational mental states and actions (Level 7). Only
as 5-year-olds did the boys represent characters at Levels 3 and 4; and even at this age,
they did not represent "persons" by using a "Desire-BeliefPsychology." Once again,
these gender differences point to boys' and girls' development of two different models of
character representation. The elaborated model ofcharacter representation illuminates
what was suggested by the more basic model: girls develop gradually more complex and
well-differentiated representations of characters in their stories and abandon representing
only simple actions and descriptions, while boys at each age continue to focus on actions,
but move toward individuating characters' intentions-in-action, and toward representing a
few "persons" by motivating actions through mental states.
C. Theory-of-Mind in Character Representations
A third analysis focused on the development ofchildren's abilities to use their
"theories ofmind" to portray characters' internal states and coordinate them with actions.
As outlined in the introduction, preschool children are said to develop a "representational .
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theory ofmind" in three successive stages. Children's "Simple Desire Psychology".
includes their nonrepresentational understanding ofperception, emotion, desire and
intentionality in action (Levels 3, 4, and 5 in the elaborated model); their "Desire-Belief
Psychology" includes a representational understanding of desire, and a rudimentary
understanding ofknowledge states that are not coordinated with actions (Level 6); and
their "Belief-Desire Psychology" includes their ability to understand that beliefs can be
false, and that both true and false beliefs mediate actions (Level 7). This model
corresponds nicely to the basic typology of character representation in the current study:
"Actors" in the basic typology are not represented by the use of any "theory ofmind,"
"characters" are represented by a "Simple Desire Psychology," and "persons" are divided
into "Desire-Belief' (Level 6) and "Belief-Desire" (Level 7) representations.
The development of children's ability to use their "theories ofmind" to represent
psychologically complex characters was analyzed by a four-way mixed factorial ANOVA
with semester (fall, spring) and Theory-of-Mind psychologies ("no theory ofmind,"
"Simple Desire Psychology," "Desire-BeliefPsychology," "Belief-Desire Psychology")
as the within factors, and gender (girls, boys) and age (3-, 4-, 5-year-olds) as the between
factors. In general, the results of this analysis support the general pattern of the previous
analyses. This analysis showed a significant Age x Theory ofMind interaction (E [6,72]
= 9.38, p < .00001), indicating that children use increasingly more sophisticated "theories
ofmind" to represent characters with age. The significant Semester x Theory ofMind
interaction (E [3, 72] = 3.92, p = .01) indicates that the children also used more
sophisticated "theories ofmind" for character representation between semesters. Finally,
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the significant Gender x Theory ofMind interaction (E [3,72] = 7.86, 12 = .0001) showed
that boys and girls used different "theories ofmind" to represent their characters.
As previously indicated, the 3-year-olds mainly represented "actors" and a few
"characters" in their stories, thus there are only a few Theory-of-Mind representations in
their stories (84% of the 3-ye.ar-olds' stories had "no theory ofmind," see Table 5 for age
group mean proportions). However, the 3-year-olds did begin to use a "Sim12le Desire
Psychology" to represent some "characters," particularly in the spring semester. As in.
the previous analyses, girls began representing more "characters" using a "Sim12le Desire
Psychology" before the boys in the fall (18% vs. 4%), and though the boys represented
more "characters" with a "Sim12le Desire Psychology" between semesters (increased from
4% to 16%), the girls continued to represent more ofthese "characters" than the boys in
the spring (30% vs. 16%, see Table 6 or Figures 16 and 17 forage/gender/semester mean
proportions).
In the 4-year-old group, the boys began to represent characters' explicit
intentions and desires by a "Simple Desire Psychology" more frequently in the fall
semester (31 %) than the 3-year-old boys did in the spring (16%), but the 4-year-old boys
did not continue to develop any further. On the other hand, the girls began the year with
about the same proportions of"Simple Desire Psychology" representations as the 3-year-
old girls had in the spring (33% vs. 30%), but increased their use of this type of
representation significantly between semesters (from 33% to 50%). In addition, only the
4-year-old girls began to represent some "persons" using a "Desire-BeliefPsychology" to
portray their representational mental states and to coordinate desires with actions. Girls
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developed these representations primarily in the fall semester (11%) and did not itwrease
them significantly in the spring (13%).
As also indicated by the previous analyses, the primary development in the 5-
year-old group was the boys' and girls' representations of "persons" using their "Belief-
Desire Psychology" to coordinate actions with desires and beliefs (from 1% at 4 years to
15% at 5 years overall, see Table 5). As Table 6 and Figures 16 and 17 indicate, girls
began portraying these representations in the fall (20% vs. 2% for 4-year-olds in the
spring), but did not continue to develop further. Instead" the girls continued to increase
their representations of "characters" using a "Simple Desire Psychology" in the spring
semester (from 46% to 60%). In contrast, boys never consistently represented "persons"
using a "Desire-BeliefPsychology" (2% in the fall, 8% in the spring) and only began
using a "Belief-Desire Psychology" in the spring semester (17%).
These patterns ofresults indicate that girls consistently used their "theories of
.mind" to represent characters' psychological worlds earlier and more frequently than the
boys. Once again, this difference can be explained by boys' overall focus on their
characters' actions, while the girls focused on elaborating characters' internal worlds
more fully. In addition, boys did not use a "Desire-BeliefPsychology" for character
representations at any age, while the girls began using this type ofrepresentation as 4-
year-olds, and contin~ed to use it while they developed "Belief-Desire" character
representations as 5-year-olds. The low proportions ofboys' "Desire-Belief' character
representations compared to the other "theory ofmind" categories suggests that "Desire-
Belief' may not be an important or stable representation level for the boys. Again, this
106
.result reflects a more general trend toward more action-oriented character representations
in the boys' stories; that is, boys use representations of internal states to motivate actions,
whereas girl focus on representations of internal states per se, and do not always
coordinate them with actions. A more explicit analysis of this trend follows.
D. Comparison of Subtypes: Landscapes of Intention-in-Action and Consciousness
The finding that boys focus more on elaborating characters' motivations for
action, while girls focus more specifically on the social and psychological worlds of their
characters was further considered by the subdivision ofLevels 3,4, and 5 into Intention-
in-Action (A) vs. Consciousness (B). Because children may also use both types to
represent characters at each level, a "Mixed" (AB) category was designed to capture
children's abilities to integrate Intention-in-Action and Consciousness. Though no
specific predictions were made for the Mixed (AB) category, I expected that boys would
produce more Intention-in-Action (A) character representations by portraying characters'
increasingly explicit intentions and motivations for acting, and girls would produce more
Consciousness (A) representations by portraying characters' perceptions, sensations and
communications (LeveI3B), emotions (4B), and explicit desire states (5C).
The girls' and boys' ratios ofIntention-in-Action (A) representations to
Consciousness (B) representations supported the predicted pattern. As shown in both
Table 7 and Figure 18 (and as the previous analyses have shown), 3-year-olds represented
very few "characters" overall. And while 4- and 5-year-olds increased their
representations of "characters" with age, the boys' representations did not increase as
substantially as those of the girls. Because of the small and unequal proportions between
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younger and older children (and between boys and girls) an ANaVA was not performed
on these data.
Nonetheless, the patterns of results illustrated by Figure 18 support my initial
prediction that boys would represent more characters' Intention-in-Action (A) and that
girls would represent more characters' Consciousness (B). However, this general pattern
holds only for the 4- and 5-year-olds; because the 3-year-olds represented very few
"characters," the proportions of these subtypes were very similar between the boys and
girls. In contrast, the difference between the proportions ofboys' higher representations
ofIntention-in-Action (A) and girls' higher representations of Consciousness (B)
character representations is considerable at 4 and 5 years. Specifically, 4-year-old girls
represented characters' Consciousness about five times more frequently than they
represented their Intentions-in-Action (46% vs. 9%), but the 4-year-old-boys represented
characters' Intention-in-Action five times more frequently than Consciousness (22% vs.
4%). The 5-year-old girls represented characters' Consciousness twice as frequently
than they represented Intention-in-Action (28% vs. 14%), and the 5-year-old boys
represented characters' Intention-in-Action twice as frequently than they represented
Consciousness (18% vs. 9%). This pattern suggests that gender differences in boys' and
girls' uses of the landscapes ofIntention-in-Action (A) and Consciousness (B) for their
portrayals of characters have developed initially at age 4 and continued to age 5.
It is also interesting to note that the girls' Level 5 character representations did not
follow the same pattern as their Level 3 and 4 character representations (see Table 7).
That is, girls did not represent more characters as 5B (explicit desire states) than 5A
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(explicit goals for action). Instead, both girls and boys had higher proportions of 5A
character representations than 5B. This may reflect either children's general tendency to
portray .characters' desires through actions, or it could be an artifact ofmy coding
scheme, in which 5A is a broader category, which may be represented in a variety of
ways, whereas 5B can only be portrayed by children's attribution ofwords like "wanted"
or ''wished'' to their characters. A more plausible interpretation of this result comes from
differences within girls' and boys' Level 5A character representations: it seems that while
boys use markers like "tried to" to denote the intentionality of their characters' actions,
girls tend to use more spoken dialogue and commands between characters like "Let's·
go..." to express their characters' desires or intentions. Though I did not specifically
analyze these tendencies, they may explain why girls represent more characters at 5A
than 5B, especially in the 5-year-old group. Instead ofdescribing their characters' desire
states directly, girls may use their characters' social interactions to embed discussion of
their intentions, which were coded as Intention-in-Action.
E. Summary
All of the above analyses support the character representation models
hypothesized by this study. Roughly, they show that 3-year-old children portray mainly
"actors" who may simply act (Levell) or are described (Level 2); 4-year-olds begin to
represent "characters" who have basic psychological capacities and implicit intentions for
interacting in a (social) world (Level 3) or who may respond through emotion or action to
events aroundthem (Level 4) or have explicit desires and intentions (Level 5). Finally, 5-
year-olds begin to portray "persons" by using their "representational theories of mind" to
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portray thoughts and feelings which mayor may not be coordinated with actions (Levels
7 and 6, respectively).
While children generally developed each ofthe basic levels in the hypothesized
order, girls tended to develop them earlier, and follow the elaborated model's order more
closely than the boys. As, illuminated by the more elaborated model analysis, boys
focused more on characters' actions, external descriptions, and explicit intentions for
action before they began to fill out "characters" and "persons" more fully. When boys
did begin to individuate "characters," they focused more on the landscape ofaction, by
elaborating implicit intentions (3A) and action responses (4A), while girls focused more
on the landscape of consciousness, by elaborating characters sensations, perceptions,
communications (3B) and emotional responses (4B) to a social world. In summary, these
results support the predictions ofthis study.
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GENERAL DISCUSSION
The results of this study show that, contrary to claims from previous narrative
research, preschool children can develop increasingly sophisticated and psychological
character representations in the stories they tell. The analyses were based on two
typologies of character representation: first, a basic typology that modeled general shifts
in character representation, from "actors" to "characters" to "persons," and second, a
more elaborated seven-level typology that modeled more specific transitions in children's
character representations within the more basic typology. In addition, the more
elaborated typology of character representation divided the development of the level of
"character" into two distinct paths of development (the landscapes ofIntention-in-Action
[A] and Consciousness [B]) which became integrated at the next level of "person."
A. The Developmental Model of Character Representation
The results show that changes in 3-,4-, and 5-year-olds' character representations
follow the hypothesized sequence ofboth the basic and more elaborated typologies.
Specifically, 3-year-olds focused mainly on representing "actors" defined by their actions
(Levell) and simple external or public characteristics (Level 2). Four-year-olds began to
more frequently represent "characters," who are defined by basic psychological capacities
(Levels 3. 4. and 5). Finally, 5-year-olds began to also represent "persons," who are
defined by their mental representations that became coordinated with actions (Levels 6
ill1d..1). Thus, there was a gradual development of "actors" to "characters" to "persons,"
with "persons" comprising 25% ofthe5':"year-olds' representations (see Table 1).
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While this general progression supports the models outlined for the development
of character representation in young children's narratives, boys and girls followed
different trajectories of development, which strongly suggests that they develop two
different models ofpersonhood in their stories. Interestingly, girls at every age group
represented more oftheir characters at higher levels than boys, indicating that girls'
character representations developed earlier than the boys. And while the girls'
development followed both the basic and more elaborated typologies closely, the boys
followed more the progression outlined by the basic model and less that outlined by the
elaborated model. More specifically, 3-year-old girls represented "actors" (Levels I and
2) and some simple "characters" (Level 3 only). Four-year-old girls developed toward
representing more "characters" (Levels 4 and 5) and a few "persons" (Level 6 only), and
5-year-olds girls developed toward more explicitly intentional "characters" (Level 5) and
psychological (Levels 6 and 7) "persons." As the girls gradually increased their complex
character representations, they gradually decreased their representations of simpler levels
(see Table 4).
In contrast, as boys developed more complex character representations, their
simpler representations remained high. Instead of developing along the levels ofthe
elaborated model, boys focused on a subset of the levels. Boys shifted from the 3-year-
olds' almost exclusive focus on "actors" (Levels I and 2) to 4-year-olds' increasing
portrayals of characters' explicit intentions (Level 5) while continuing to represent
mainly actors. The 5-year-olds boys began to differentiate their representation of
"characters" by portraying them across Levels 3, 4, and 5, and also began to represent
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"persons" by using a "Belief-Desire Psychology" (Level 7). Unlike the girls, who first
portrayed "persons" knowledge states simply (Level 6) before coordinating them with
actions (Level 7), the boys rarely ever mentioned "persons" knowledge states without
coordinating them with actions.
This pattern ofresults reflects the different models ofpersonhood that girls and
boys construct through their character representations. As Nicolopoulou (1996b; 1997c)
has argued, girls and boys have different intentions for storytelling that are expressed in
their collaborative construction ofdifferent identities through their storytelling and story-
acting activities. Nicolopoulou has demonstrated that these children's spontaneous,
socially situated narratives are vehicles for children's co-construction of gender identity,
and that the processes (and products) of this identity construction are clearly visible in the
form and content of girls' and boys' narratives. In accord with this argument, I would
suggest that the differences in girls' and boys' character representations demonstrated in
this study may not be due as much to differences in girls' and boys' ability to understand
the mental worlds of others, rather, these differences are products of girls' and b.oys'
construction of different explicit working models ofpersonhood expressed through their
different narrative intentions of character representation. This interpretation fits nicely
with the picture of development that has been presented. That is, both boys and girls are
capable of representing psychologically complex characters but nonetheless follow very
different paths of development. Girls gradually shifted away from representing simple
"actors" to representing both simply psychological "characters" and thinking "persons"
through their. interactions with other characters, while boys at every age group
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represented a significant portion of"actors" while developing explicitly intentional
"characters" and "persons" whose representational mental states were coordinated with
actions. This pattern suggests that while boys are capable of representing characters at.
higher levels, they focus mariy of their character representations on actions, and that their
higher-level representations ofcharacters' psychological states are based primarily on
elaborating and motivating sequences of actions. Ofcourse, this interpretation does not
rule out the possibility that girls may develop some types of social understanding earlier
than boys, but situates this possibility within the larger development of children's explicit
models ofpersonhood.
This conclusion that girls and boys have different narrative intentions that reflect
different underlying conceptions ofpersonhood further explains the pattern ofresults
found in the comparison of character subtypes in Levels 3 and 4. Girls portrayed more
"characters" in terms oftheir simple psychological capacities for interaction (Leve13B)
and emotional reactions (LeveI4B) and boys represented more characters in terms of
their implicit intentions for acting (LeveI3A) and action responses (LeveI4A). Like the
pattern of development across the levels of the models, these different developmental
trajectories show that preschool boys and girls construct different models ofpersonhood
in their character representations that correspond to the landscapes of Intention-in-Action
(A) and Consciousness (B). These gender differences show that, although both boys and
girls developed psychological representation of characters in their stories, their specific
trajectories ofdevelopment differ based on different conceptions ofpersonhood as
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revealed through different sets ofnarrative intentions: a landscape of Intention-in-Action,
and a landscape of Consciousness.
B. Addressing the Apparent Time Lag between Narrative and Social
UnderstandingLTheory of Mind Research
While the above patterns of results support the model ofcharacter development
proposed in this study, this evidence is at odds with the findings of several narrative
research studies that claim that young children are not capable ofrepresenting
psychologically complex characters in their stories. The results of the current study
~ .
suggest that children's character representations do not lag far behind their achievement
of early social understanding and "theories ofmind" as has been documented in both
naturalistic and experimental studies. In fact, my results suggest that children's explicit
expression oftheir models ofpersonhood through character representations follow their
naturalistic and experimental precursors by one year or less, a lag which is far less than
the 3 to 5 year gap previously found by narrative research.
As suggested earlier, the key explanation for children's ability to represent
psychologically complex character representations during the preschool years (rather than
later in middle childhood) lies in the methodology espoused in this study. Unlike
previous narrative research studies, which have primarily analyzed stories eli~ited by
experimental techniques such as story-topics, story-stems, and wordless picture books
and picture sequences, this study analyzed stories generated as part of children's everyday
social life in the classroom. This study argues that when children are allowed and
encouraged to tell stories to and for their peers (and in an everyday, ongoing basis), they
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are able to construct more sophisticated character representations that more accurately
reflect their developing models ofpersons acting in social worlds. Evidence for this point
comes not only from the earlier development of the children's character representations in
this study, but also from the above analyses which indicate significant development
toward more sophisticated arid psychological between school semesters. These results
highlight the importance ofchildren's ongoing participation in storytelling and story-
acting for their development of sophisticated character representations. In contrast to
previous narrative research, this methodological difference encourages children's own
intentions for storytelling, and thus, their strategies for representing more complex
characters. Furthermore, the typologies developed by this study were aimed at
uncovering these strategies. Hence, the results of this study confirm that when properly
situated and appropriately analyzed, preschool children's character representations do not
lag far behind their earliest displays of social understanding or "theories ofmind."
However, there remains an age discrepancy of about one year between children's
naturalistic and experimental displays oftheir developing social understanding and their
explicit expression of this knowledge in their spontaneous, fictional narratives. This
smaller lag was predicted based on the difference between the decontextualized language
skills required for storytelling and the more contextualized, socially-supported nature of
everyday discourse and even those of experimental tasks. To recapitulate this argument
(made at length in the Introduction), children may display early social understanding in
conversations with adults, older siblings, or peers due to the support of the social context.
Likewise, experimental tasks may also bootstrap children's abilities to express their
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developing understanding ofothers' minds. However, unlike both of these situations,
storytelling is unique in that children must use only words to construct a social world and
to situate and manipulate characters within it. This is a significantly more demanding
process than either socially-supported conversations or experimentally-supported task
requirements.
Similarly to the findings of research on children's early social understanding,
some studies on pretend play have shown that children as young as 2 to 3 years of age can
begin to attribute some internal states to the toy props they play with (e.g., Mascolo &
Chasse, 1998; Tarullo, 1994; Wolf et aI., 1984). Analyses ofpretend play have often
focused on children's individual productions, for which they do not receive support from
older siblings, peers, or adults as they do in everyday conversations. However, I argue
that children are nonetheless supported by toy props, and furthermore, do not have to
construct the same type of self-contextualizing world as they do in narratives. More
specifically, when children are given dolls or setting toys to use in enactments, they do
not need to verbally construct these items (or persons) with language; Furthermore,
children often explicitly identify with the toy dolls in their play, and produce loosely-
connected dialogues between characters in which all the details of situation, action, and
temporal or causal connections between events is completely missing and
"contextualized" with the use of the toy props. While children do not need to focus on
narrating a situated, coherent, or understandable story for any listeners in these play
monologues, they can become very emotionally involved, with the result that the
psychological content of the play enactment may be quite sophisticated, though language
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of the monologue does not rise to the level of truly decontextualized narratives. Paley
(1990) has made a similar observation in the comparison ofher students' sociodramatic
play and narratives, and suggested that preschool children's fantasy is first expressed in
( .
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.their pretend play, and later explicitly expressed and formalized in children's storytelling
and story-acting. In addition to these differences in levels of independent, explicit, and
decontextualized language necessary for play vs. narratives, it should also be noted that
most young children engage in pretend play both by themselves and with others on an
everyd.ay basis, while storytelling is often a less frequent activity, for which children need
to develop expertise in order to represent psychologically complex characters.
Together, the more contextualized, simpler task demands ofpretend play, along
with the greater possibility for children's development of expertise in this domain, and
the resultant private, highly emotional engagement ofchildren in it, explains the evidence
that children can attribute psychological states to the dolls in their pretend play at about
the same time as they talk about them in everyday conversations, but prior to the
developments in children's story character representations as outline above. In short,
only storytelling requires young children to verbally construct social worlds and to
explicitly represent their conception ofpersons acting in those social worlds. (This
argument coincides with Nelson et al.'s [1998] point that narrative constructions are
better representations of children's "theories ofmind" than their interpretations of the
events in Theory-of-Mind tasks.) Thus, when yourig children are encouraged to
participate in everyday, socially-situated storytelling and story-acting, their narrative
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productions serve as a unique source of infonnation about how children understand
persons and their actions and relations in the world.
C. Implications for Social Cognition Research
So far, I have argued that children's representations ofcharacters in their
spontaneous; socially-situated narratives develop later than in their early, contextualized
expressions of social understanding. Because young children's character representations
are independent and explicit expressions oftheir developing models ofpersonhood, it
follows that research on children's early (contextualized or implicit) social understanding
is inadequate to capture its development. In contrast, the typologies presented in this
study capture the development ofchildren's explicit integrations ofpersons' actions,
intentions, and psychological states within a social world.
In the typologies proposed by this study, the development of "actors" to
"characters" represents a shift from models ofpers~nhood that include only basic
representations of actions (Levell) and simple characteristics (Level 2) to models in
which personhood is first viewed as intentional and psychological in a very basic way.
At the "actor" level, social interaction can only be accomplished by acting on or with
another actor. However, at the "character" level, actions, reactions, and interactions are
increasingly imbued with intentionality, or purpose (Level 3A, 4A, and 5A), and
characters first begin to interact in their worlds using basic-level psychological processes:
that is, first characters see, feel, and communicate (LeveI3B), later characters can have
emotional reactions to what they experience (LeveI4B), and finally, their intentions are
experienced as explicit internal states, like desires (Level 5B).
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In particular, the basic category of"character" Was differentiated into the
landscape of Intention-in-Action, which develops in three levels: from implicit
intentionality (3A) to reactive intentionality (4A) to explicit intentionality (SA).. This I
conceptualization of children's developing representations ofcharacters' intentionality
has not been considered by any existing developmental or narrative research. Thus, I
based this progression on Searle's (1983) philosophical account oflevels of
"Intentionality." The results of this study show that this progression was followed, but
only by the girls. Boys, on the other hand, focused more on representing characters'
. explicit intentions (SA) before gradually increasing their representations of their implicit
intentions (3A) or reactive intentionality (4A). Once again, these differences can be
explained by boys' and girls' different intentions in storytelling. Nonetheless, the
typology ofdevelopment from implicit intention (3A) to reactive intention (4A) to
explicit intention (SA) is an important, though at this point tentative, contribution of the
current study toward the conceptualization ofchildren's developing understanding of
intentionality.
In contrast to the inadequacies of developmental research to model the lower
levels of children's character representations, the later transition from "characters" to
"persons" fits well with the documented transitions in children's development of
"representational theories ofmind." These models assume that children understand that
persons are Intentional beings, and focus on children's undejStanding that others have
representational mental states that me.diate their actions. While the children's
representations of characters' mental states and activities sometimes take the stereotypic
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form offalse-beliefparadigmst they also can portray personst mental representations
within dialoguest or mental activities like planningt or imagining. That iSt children may
use their theories ofmind to represent everyday uses ofmental representations in various
social contexts. In generalt howevert the basic typology provided by Theory-of~Mind
models was useful in that it mapped out the development ofchildrents conceptions of
persons as psychological beings.
The analysis of childrents use oftheir increasingly sophisticated "theories of
mindtt to represent characterst mental states supported a broad shift from childrents use of
a "Simple Desire Psychologytt (Levels 3, 4, and 5) to "Belief-Desire Psychologytt or
"representational theory ofmindH (Level 7) in their narratives. This result suggests that
childrents development of character representations corresponds roughly tOt and confirms
the most basic transitions mapped out by Theory-of-Mind research. Howevert the
intermediate level ofdevelopmentt the "Desire-BeliefPsychologytt (Level 6) did not
receive strong support as an independent stage. In particulart while both boys and girls
represented some personst thoughts and beliefs in isolation before they were able to
coordinate them with actionst only the girls had a sizable proportion of Level 6 character
representations. This gender difference may once again reflect girlst overall tendency to
portray characterst psychological worlds in a wide variety ofwayst and boys' tendency to
use characters' psychological states to motivate actions. If this is the caset boys in
general should not produce representations ofcharacterst mental states without relating
them to actions (Level 6) and should move directly from using a "Simple Desire
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Psychology" to a "Belief-Desire Psychology" in their character representations. This is
exactly the pattern ofobserved results.
v. Summary
The purpose ofthis study was to map out the development of young children's
representations ofcharacters in their stories. Contrary to the findings ofpast narrative
research, this study demonstrates that preschool children's character representations
develop from simplistic accounts of actions to more fully psychological portrayals. This
finding is dependent on two major contributions to narrative development research: first,
this study analyzed stories generated by children's participation in an everyday, socially-
situated storytelling and story-acting activity that promotes children's development of
spontaneous narratives that are far more sophisticated than the experimentally-elicited
stories analyzed by most narrative research. Second, prompted by initial evidence that
preschoolers' character representations produced through this activity were far more
sophisticated than those in experimentally-elicited stories, this study proposed and
supported a theoretically-motivated, differentiated, and refined typology that captures
young children's developing strategies for character representations in their narratives.
This study has argued that children's character representations are an important
vehicle for their construction and expression of explicit working models ofpersons as
agents in social worlds. The typology ofcharacter representation presented was based on
this argument. Analyses of 3-,4-, and 5-year-old boys' and girls' character
representations showed that a basic typology describes the general pattern of
development: children first represent simple "actors," then they begin to flesh out
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"characters" with basic psychological capacities, before they can begin to represent
"persons" who have mental representations which become coordinated with actions. In
addition to this general progression, the more elaborated typology of character
representation captured differences in boys' and girls' timing and focus of development
that reveal two different underlying conceptions of personhood. That is, boys' character
representations elaborated a landscape of Intention-in-Action, whereas girls developed a
landscape of Consciousness.
Importantly, neither the general progression of development"nor the more
detailed conceptions ofpersonh~od that this study has uncovered in preschool children's
narratives have been previously found. Therefore, this study has important implications
for narrative research, suggesting that more research should fg..cus on children's everyday,
socially-situated narratives as a source for better understanding children's narrative
development. Secondly, this study also points to the importance ofusing models of
narrative development that seek to uncover children's own strategies and intentions for
storytelling rather than analyzing children's narratives only according to adult models. In
addition, the findings of this study are also important for research on children's social
understanding. Children's character representations are explicit expressions of their
developing models ofpersonhood, and thus are important sources of information about
how children think about themselves and others as agents in social worlds. Furthermore,
this study argues that children use socially-situated storytelling to collaboratively
construct these explicit working models ofpersonhood; therefore, children's character
123
representations can be viewed both as tools for the construction of social understanding
and as the works-in-progress of this constructive process.
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APPENDIX: Schematic Overview of Character Representation Levels
ACTORS
Levell. Action Only: Actors perfonn actions and are acted upon. Actors
are not further described.
Leyel2. External Characteristics: Actors are fleshed out by externally
identifiable characteristics such as physical traits, names, and possessions.
CHARACTERS
begin to be individuated as entities with basic psychological capacities
through two types:
A. Intention-in-Action B. Consciousness
Level 3A. Implicit Intention:
Characters' actions are marked as
agentive.
Level 4A. Reactive Intentionality:
Characters' reactions are linked to
causes by "so" and "because."
Level SA. Explicit Intention-in-
Action: Characters' explicit
intentions are marked by "tried
to," goal-oriented action
Level 3B. Simple Interactional
Capacity: Characters see, feel
and communicate.
Level 4B. Emotional Reaction:
Characters have emotional
reactions and are evaluative.
Level SB. Desire States: Characters
have explicit psychological
desire states such
as wants and wishes.
PERSONS
represented as entities motivated by higher psychological capacities;
integration oflntention-in-Action and Consciousness resulting in a
representational theory ofmind.
Level 6. Desire-Belief: Persons have desires and beliefs, but their actions
are still motivated by their desires alone, not by thoughts or beliefs.
Level 7. Belief-Desire: Persons' beliefs and desires are coordinated to
motivate their actions. False beliefs are also represented at this level
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Table 1 ~
Mean Proportions (%) ofBasic Character Categories by 3-. 4-, and 5-year-olds, Averaged
over Gender and Semesters
Basic Level Categories
Age Group
3-year-olds
4-year-olds
5-year-olds
Actors
80
56
32
Characters
17
35
43
140
Persons
3
9
25
Table 2
Mean Proportions (%) ofBasic Character Categories by 3-.4-. and 5-year-old Girls and
Boys, by Semester
Group
Fall
Actors Characters Persons
Spring
Actors Characters Persons
3-year-olds
Girls 72 18 10 70 30 0
Boys 96 4 0 83 16 2
4-year-olds
Girls 56 33 11 35 50 15
Boys 67 31 2 65 27 8
5-year-olds
Girls 21 46 33 5 60 35
Boys 60 32 8 42 34 24
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Table 3
Mean Proportions (%) ofElaborated Character Representation Levels by 3-. 4-, and 5-
year-olds, Averaged over Gender and Semesters
Character Representation Level
Age Group
3-year-olds
4-year-olds
5-year-olds
1
48
25
12
2
32
31
20
3
13
16
14
142
4
2
7
12
5
2
12
16
6
2
8
11
7
o
1
15
Table 4
Mean Proportions (%) ofElaborated Character Representation Levels by 3-.4-. and 5-
year-old Girls and Boys, Ayeraged over Semesters
Character Representation Level
Group 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3-year-olds
Girls 49 22 20 3 1 3 2
Boys 47 42 5 2 3 1 0
4-year-olds
Girls 22 24 23 11 8 12 1
Boys 28 38 9 3 16 4 1
5-year-olds
Girls 4 9 17 14 21 16 19
Boys 20 30 12 10 11 5 12
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Table 5
Mean Proportions (%) of TheOly-of-Mind Psychologies by 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds,
Averaged over Gender and Semesters
Theory-of-Mind Psychologies
Age Group
3-year-olds
4-year-olds
5-year-olds
raMO
84
62
37
raMI
11
32
41
rOM2
3
5
7
rOM3
2
1
15
Note. raMO = No "theory ofmind," raMI = "Simple Desire Psychology,"
TOM2 ="Desire-BeliefPsychology," and rOM3 = "Belief-Desire Psychology."
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Table 6
Mean Proportions (%) of"Theory ofMind" Psychologies by 3-. 4-. and 5-year-old Girls
and Boys. by Semester
Group
Fall
TOMO TOMI TOM2 TOM3
Spring
TOMO TOMI TOM2 TOM3
3-year-olds
Girls 72 18 7 3 70 30 0 0
Boys 96 4 0 0 83 16 2 0
4-year-olds
Girls 56 33 11 0 35 50 13 2
Boys 67 31 0 2 65 27 8 0
5-year-olds
Girls 21 46 13 20 5 60 18 18
Boys 60 32 2 6 40 34 8 17
Note. TOMO = No "theory ofmind," TOMI ="Simple Desire Psychology,"
TOM2 = "Desire-BeliefPsychology," and TOM3 = "Belief-Desire Psychology."
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Table 7
Mean Proportions (%) of "Charilcter" Levels and Types by 3-. 4-. and 5-year-old Girls
and Boys, Averaged over Semesters
Group
Level 5
Level 3
A B AB
Level 4
A B AB A B AB
3-year-olds
Girls 8 8 4 0 2 1 1 0 0
Boys 3 2 1 1 0 1 1 1 1
4-year-olds
Girls 4 14 5 2 30 6 3 2 2
Boys 7 1 1 1 1 1 14 2 0
5-year-olds
Girls 1 13 2 3 11 1 10 4 7
Boys 4 5 3 7" 3 0 7 1 3
Note. A = Action, B= Consciousness, and AB = Mixed
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Figure 1. 3-Year-Old Girls: Proportions of stories per child at each level of Character
Representation (Basic Categories), with group mean.
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Figure 5. 4-Year-Old Boys: Proportions of stories per child at each level of Character
Representation (Basic Categories), with group mean.
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Figure 6. 5-Year-Old Boys: Proportions of stories per child at each level of Character
Representation (Basic Categories), with group mean.
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Figure 7. Mean Proportions (%) ofBasic Level Character Representations by 3-, 4-, and
5-Year-Old Girls and Boys, Fall Semester.
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Figure 8. Mean Proportions (%) ofBasic Level Character Representations by 3-, 4-, and
5-Year-Old Girls and Boys, Spring Semester.
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Figure 9. 3-Year-Old Girls: Proportions of stories per child at each level of Character
Representation (Elaborated Categories), with group mean.
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Figure 10. 4-Year-Old Girls: Proportions of stories per child at each level ofCharacter
Representation (Elaborated Categories), with group mean.
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Figure 11. 5-Year-Old Girls: Proportions of stories per child at each level of Character
Representation (Elaborated Categories), with group mean.
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Figure 12. 3-Year-Old Boys: Proportions of stories per child at each level of Character
Representation (Elaborated Categories), with group mean.
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Figure 13. 4-Year-Old Boys: Proportions of stories per child at each level of Character
Representation (Elaborated Categories), with group mean.
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Figure 14. 5-Year-Old Boys: Proportions of stories per child at each level of Character
Representation (Elaborated Categories), with group mean.
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Figure 15. Mean Proportions (%) ofElaborated Level Character Representations by'3-,
4-, and 5-Year-Old Girls and Boys, Averaged Over Semesters.
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Figure 16. Mean Proportions (%) ofTheory-of-Mind Psychologies by 3-, 4-, and 5-Year-
Old Girls and Boys, Fall Semester.
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Figure 17. Mean Proportions (%) ofTheory-of-Mind Psychologies by 3-,4-, and 5-Year-
Old Girls and Boys, Spring Semester.
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Figure 18. Mean Proportions (%) of"Character" Subtypes by 3-, 4-, and 5-Year-Old
Girls and Boys, averaged over semesters.
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